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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. GLEAVE,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,

]
]

vs.

]

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Respondents
and
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

]
]I
(Case No. 20166)
]I
(Case No. 20300)
]
I Consolidated Case No. 2030
]
]
]
]
]
]

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS THE DENVER AND
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY AND UTAH RAILWAY COMPANY

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether a new trial should be ordered for the

reason that there is insufficient evidence to justify the
jury's verdict to the extent it found no negligence on the part
of the plaintiff.
2.

Whether a new trial should be ordered because the

Rio Grande was denied its due process right to an impartial and
unbiased jury.
3.

Whether the lower court erred in denying the Rio

Grande's motion for partial summary judgment that it owed no
duty to plaintiff to:

(1) change the physical configurations

present at the 1600 South Crossing from those which the UDOT
evaluated at the time it mandated the crossing protection which
existed at the time of the accident, or (2) slow the speed of
its trains to below that which UDOT recognized when it mandated
the existing crossing protection, or (3) perform any duties
exclusively preempted by UDOT and UPSC.
4.

Whether a new trial should be ordered because of

plaintiff's counsel's surprise and improper use in closing
argument of testimony from a witness excused from the stand by
order of the trial court without further direct examination and
without any cross-examination.
5.

Whether a new trial should be ordered because the

lower court denied the Rio Grande's requested jury instruction
which would have instructed the jury that it could consider
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whether plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by not wearing
his seatbelt.
6.

Whether it was error for the lower court to grant

defendant Utah Department of Transportation's pre-trial motion
to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a personal injury action arising from injuries
sustained by plaintiff when he drove his automobile into the
path of an oncoming train owned and operated by the Rio
Grande.

The accident occurred at a railroad crossing in

Springville, Utah, which was protected by advance warning
signs, railroad crossing signs and, in addition, a stop sign
which required motorists to stop before proceeding across the
railroad tracks.

The plaintiff's vehicle was eastbound a: the

time of the accident and was struck by a southbound train.

The

Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") was joined as a
defendant because it allegedly breached certain statutory
duties to install adequate traffic warning devices at the
crossing.
The Rio Grande has appealed from a judgment based upon
a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and it has appealed an
order of the lower court dismissing co-defendant UDOT prior to
trial.

In what is now designated a cross-appeal, the plaintiff

has appealed the lower court's order granting the Rio Grande's
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motion for a directed verdict as to plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages.
B.

(R. 806; also Addendum Exhibit E " ) .

Disposition of the Case Below

This action was tried before a jury in the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable
Cullen Y. Christensen presiding.

Prior to trial, the lower

court denied the Rio Grande's, the City of Springville's, and
the plaintiff's respective motions for summary judgment.
407 and 569; also Addendum Exhibit " D " ) .

(R.

A pre-trial motion to

dismiss filed by UDOT was granted on the grounds that UDOT was,
in the lower court's opinion, immune from suit under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.

(R. 569; also Addendum Exhibit

"D").
A five day jury trial was held in June, 1984.

After

the close of all the evidence, the lower court denied the Rio
Grande's motion for a directed verdict, but granted defendant
City of Springville's motion for a directed verdict.
1085).

(R.

The case was submitted to the jury upon comparative

negligence instructions, the court having denied the Rio
Grande's motions for summary judgment (R. 460-61; 569-70) and
for a directed verdict (R. 1349; 1355) requesting that the
plaintiff be found negligent as a matter of law.

The jury

returned its verdict, finding the Rio Grande 100% at fault and
the plaintiff 0% at fault.
"A").

(R. 765-68; also Addendum Exhibit

The lower Court entered judgment against the Rio Grande

on August 15, 1984, in the amount of $439,937.87.
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(R. 808-09;

also Addendum Exhibit " B " ) . The lower court denied post-trial
motions filed by the Rio Grande seeking, in the alternative, a
new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or an
alteration or amendment of the judgment.

(R. 906; also

Addendum Exhibit " C " ) .
C.

Statement of Facts

The Rio Grande's main line tracks are crossed by a
narrow, infrequently travelled, country road at 1600 South in
Springville, Utah (R. 1244).

In this area of Utah County, the

railroad's tracks run generally in a north-south direction and,
as can be seen from the numerous photographic exhibits, the
grade for these tracks was established by making a long cut
through a hillside which extends several hundred yards to the
north from 1600 South.

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 2A-2G,

2I-2M, 47, and 48; Defendant's Trial Exhibits 22-33, and 41).
This hillside causes a substantial obstruction of the view that
an eastbound motorist has of a train coming from the north,
but, since the hill essentially ends at 1600 South, an
eastbound motorist's view to his right, or south, is relatively
unobstructed (R. 1739).

The top of the hillside, including

portions which were on the railroad right of way, had weeds
growing on it.

The train in this instance was southbound and,

since plaintiff was eastbound at the time, it approached the
crossing from plaintiff's left.

The train was travelling at 50

mph and there was no claim that this speed exceeded any speed
limits imposed by either governmental entities or the railroad
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itself.

The crossing had the usual round yellow sign with a

cross on it to provide an advance warning to motorists of the
upcoming railroad crossing, and the usual crossbucks at the
point of the crossing to denote its location.

In addition,

this crossing had a stop sign (R. 1749).
Plaintiff Robert L. Gleave testified that he was
driving eastbound on 1600 South Street in Springville on the
morning of April 16, 1982 (R. 1746-48), and that he knew he was
approaching a railroad crossing on 1600 South Street because he
had been over these tracks about three other times and because
he had worked on the crossing itself as part of an asphalt
paving crew in 1979 (R. 1748 and 1757).

There was enough

daylight so that he was not using his vehicle's headlights (R.
1748), the window on the driver's side was almost all the way
up (R. 1749), and the vehicle's heater was on (R. 1743).
Under direct examination, Mr. Gleave testified that
his radio was "off" (R. 1749) but, during cross-examination, he
conceded that he did not know for sure but believed it was off
(R. 1755).

The railroad claim agent who investigated the

accident testified that when he examined plaintiff's vehicle on
the morning of the accident, its radio switch was in the "on"
position (R. 938).
The plaintiff testified that he saw "all the warning
signs on the road" as he approached the railroad crossing (R.
1749 and 1757).

Although he had told the investigating police

officer that he had only "slowed down" for the stop sign (R.
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1422), during trial he testified that he came to a complete
stop at the stop sign.

(R. 1749).

He further testified that

while stopped at the stop sign, he looked to the left (north)
and saw no train approaching (R. 1749).

A video tape prepared

by plaintiff's expert, and offered into evidence by the
plaintiff, demonstrated that the headlights and the top of a
train approaching from the north at 50 mph could be seen even
by a motorist stopped at the stop sign for approximately six
seconds, but, from that point on the roadway, the view of the
rest of the train was substantially obstructed by the
hillside.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 47.)

The weeds caused

little additional obstruction, even though the video tape was
made in June when the weeds would have had an additional two
months of growth.
The plaintiff next testified that after stopping at
the sign and looking left, he then looked to his right (south)
and that he continued looking to the right as he started up
from the stop sign towards the tracks (R. 1750).

He

acknowledged that his view to the left (north) was more
restricted than his view to the right (south), claiming that
from the stop sign he could see about 900 feet down the tracks
to his right (south), but only 50-100 feet up the tracks to his
left (north) (R. 1758-59).

Nevertheless, he testified

unequivocally that he travelled from the stop sign to a point
where he could no longer stop and avoid the collision while
looking only to his right (R. 1759-60).
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He claimed that he

heard the train whistle and saw the train as he glanced back to
his left (north) while his car was moving (R. 1750) and that
upon seeing and hearing the train, he immediately stopped his
car (R. 1750).
The plaintiff further testified that his vehicle
stopped with its front end about one foot from the west track
(R. 1750, 1761-62 and 1765), and the train hit his vehicle
while he was trying to put it into reverse and move it from
that position (R. 1750).

He was not wearing his seatbelt at

the time of the collision (R. 1750).

He testified that he saw

the train about two or three seconds before the collision (R.
1750), and that he believes the train would not have hit his
vehicle i_f he had stopped at the point where his vehicle was
when he saw the train (R. 1775-76).

He was certain that he

only stopped at the stop sign and at the point where the front
of his vehicle was when it was impacted by the train (R. 1761,
1765).

He did not stop a second time at a point between the

stop sign and the tracks, where his view to the left would have
been unobstructed by the hillside.
Robert Mitchell, chief of the New Jersey Department of
Transportation's Grade Crossing Section was called as an expert
by plaintiff.

Mr. Mitchell testified that an eastbound driver

stopped with his front bumper at the stop sign could see about
250 feet up the tracks to to the left (north) (R. 1733-34), and
that it would be "suicidal" for a driver not to pull up closer
to the tracks to get a better view and stop a second time
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before proceeding across the tracks (R. 1734).

He further

testified that an eastbound driver who pulls slightly forward
from the stop sign can see about 430-450 feet up the tracks to
the left (north); that a driver who pulled forward and stopped
a second time would be able to see a train approaching the
crossing from the left (north) for about six seconds, assuming
the train was travelling at the uncontroverted speed in this
instance of 50 mph (R. 1734-35); and that it would be
"foolhardy" for a driver to try to beat the train if it was
only 450 feet or 6 seconds from the crossing (R. 1735).
This testimony was in substantial agreement with the
testimony of experts called by the railroad.

The defense

experts testified that a driver stopped at the stop sign could
see only 285 feet of track north of the crossing (R. 974), but
that if a motorist were to pull forward to a point five feet
from the stop sign, he could see 474 feet of track to the north
(R. 1361, 1369-70).

That point was almost ten feet (116

inches) from the west rail of the track (R. 1385).

The

railroad's experts agreed with plaintiff's expert, Mr.
Mitchell, that an eastbound motorist approaching this crossing
should stop a second time and look to his left (north) before
proceeding over the tracks (R. 963, 968) and that, since the
view to the right was relatively unobstructed, a motorist
proceeding east from the stop sign should be looking to his
left (north) as he proceeds to the point where his view of the
tracks in that direction becomes unobstructed (R. 969-71).
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Plaintiff called Rio Grande train crew member Bruce
Leek who testified that he was in the cab of the lead engine of
the train that collided with plaintiff's vehicle (R. 1811).

He

further testified that the subject crossing is not visible from
the train at a point one-quarter mile north of the crossing
because of a curve in the track (R. 1812).

He first saw

plaintiff's vehicle creeping toward the crossing about nine
seconds before the collision (R. 1813), and he saw plaintiff
stop with the nose of his automobile on the west rail for about
4 or 5 seconds before the automobile disappeared from his view
under the nose of the engine shortly before the impact (R.
1815).

He testified that the train had a "very loud" whistle

and that the train's engineer sounded the whistle continuously
from the quarter mile whistle post north of the 1600 South
crossing until he interrupted the normal signal with an
emergency blowing of the whistle that continued until the train
impacted the automobile (R. 1817-1818; and 1822).

The train

was travelling 50 mph at the time of the collision (R. 1818)
and he thought the plaintiff could have made it across the
subject crossing without being hit by the train (R. 1823 and
1826).
Plaintiff also called the train engineer, Gerald H.
Burton.

Mr. Burton testified that the train was travelling at

50 mph, which was the designated speed for this train (R. 1396
and 1397).

He saw the plaintiff's vehicle move slowly onto

the tracks and stop (R. 1401-02) and, at that point in time, he
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interrupted the normal whistle signal to blow the whistle in
rapid succession (R. 1402).

He testified that the photograph

marked as Defendant's Exhibit 27 (which depicts the lead engine
of a train 474 feet from the crossing (R. 1374)) shows an
engine in the approximate location where he was when he first
saw the plaintiff's vehicle.

(R. 1404-05).

He believed that

the plaintiff's vehicle was stopped on the rail for about three
to four seconds before the accident (R. 1409), and he thought
the plaintiff had adequate time to remove his vehicle from the
tracks in order to prevent the accident (R. 1412).
The plaintiff also called Sergeant David Coron of the
Springville Police Department.

Sergeant Coron testified that

he investigated this accident (R. 1416-17), that he spoke with
the plaintiff at the scene of the accident (R. 1419), and that
the plaintiff was lucid at that time (R. 1421-22).

He asked

the plaintiff what had happened and the plaintiff said he
"slowed down" for the stop sign (R. 1422; also Addendum
Exhibit " J " ) . Sergeant Coron believed that the automobile
driver's failure to stop for the stop sign was the cause of the
accident (R. 1436).

He also testified that in his opinion it

is reasonable to expect one to stop a second time at a point
between the stop sign and the tracks to get a better view to
the north (R. 1445-47).
Plaintiff's next witness was Robert H. Brey, a Brigham
Young University associate professor in audiology.

Dr. Brey

testified that his recording equipment first detected railroad

-10-

whistle sounds when a train was 792 feet from this crossing (R.
1464).

The whistle signal was measured to be audible to a

human ear, even over the background noise of an automobile,
when it was at a point that is 467 feet from the crossing
(about 6.5 seconds at 50 mph) (R. 1465).

While he was standing

at the crossing taking his measurements, he was able to hear
train whistles from all over the city of Springville, even
whistles one to two miles from the crossing (R. 1477).

He

could actually hear train whistles at the 1600 South crossing
before the sound would register on the meter he was using to
make his measurements (R. 1487).

Finally, he stated that in

his opinion, it would be pretty stupid to stop on the track if
you heard train whistles in the distance, even if you did not
know the exact location or direction of the train (R. 1492).
Plaintiff's next witness was Wayne T. Van Wagoner.
Mr. Van Wagoner testified as an expert that an eastbound driver
with his bumper at the stop sign has a sight distance of
approximately 285 feet to the north (R. 1609), that the whistle
on the train would give a driver at the crossing an additional
warning of the approaching train if the driver heard the whistle
(R. 1610), and that, given the visual limitations at the
subject crossing, he agreed that the stop sign should have been
there (R. 1628-29).

He believed the advance warning of the

railroad crossing was adequate at the subject crossing (R.
1631), and he testified that the State of Utah ultimately
determines whether the crossing protection at any given
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railroad crossing should be upgraded and that this decision is
based upon a State "hazard index" (R. 1333-34).
The Rio Grande called as a witness Mr. Arthur Geurts,
Safety Studies Engineer for UDOT.

Mr. Geurts testified that he

was responsible for UDOT's hazard index rating for all railroad
crossings in the State of Utah (R. 981). The 1600 South
crossing was one of 1280 crossings studied by the state and the
Federal Railroad Administration.

The Federal Railroad

Administration initially and incorrectly ranked it as the 68th
most dangerous among the 1280 crossings.

In computing this

ranking, the Federal Railroad Administration believed that
train speeds in the area were 70 mph (R. 989-91).

Mr. Geurts

testified that train speeds through this crossing are only TO
mph and, by assuming 50 mph for the speed of trains in the area
instead of 70 mph, the ranking of this crossing under the UDOT
hazard index was changed from the 68th most dangerous to the
353rd most dangerous of the 1280 crossings surveyed (R. 982,
989-91).

Moreover, Mr. Geurts explained that this UDOT

evaluation was done before the stop signs were installed,
which, of course, provided a motorist with additional crossing
protection and reduced the hazard (R. 983). In determining
what crossing protection to require at a particular crossing,
Mr. Geurts explained that UDOT considers factors such as a
motorist's sight distance at the crossing, the speed and number
of trains in the area, and the speed and volume of highway
traffic at the crossing (R. 985-87).
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The plaintiff called Mr. Joseph Bruce Yuhas, who was
an employee of UDOT that participated in the survey of the 1600
South crossing in October of 1974.

Mr. Yuhas testified that

the survey team considered factors such as the sight distances
and, after fully evaluating the crossing, it recommended
federal funds be sought to install flashing light signals as
additional crossing protection (R. 1247-49).

The team further

recommended that stop signs be installed until federal funds
for flashing signals became available (R. 1241, 1258-59).
Sometime after this survey, the stop signs were installed.
Obviously, much more evidence was adduced during
trial, but space limitations do not permit the recitation of
all of the evidence, and the facts essential to this appeal
have been enumerated.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because

the evidence to support the verdict of no negligence on
plaintiff's part is completely lacking or is so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust.
2.

The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial for the

reason that the Rio Grande was deprived of its due process
right to trial by an impartial jury by virtue of the
undisclosed doctor-patient relationship between juror Edna
Argyle and plaintiff's treating physician and witness Dr. John
Mendenhall.
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3.

The Court should order a new trial because the

lower court erred in the denial of the Rio Grande's pretrial
motion for partial summary judgment.

The Legislature has

vested exclusive authority over the design and protection of
railroad crossings in the hands of the Utah Department of
Transportation, subject only to review by the Utah Public
Service Commission.
4.

The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because

of plaintiff counsel's surprise and improper use during closing
arguments of the testimony of witness Willis Woodard.
5.

The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because

it was error for the lower court to deny the Rio Grande's
requested Jury Instruction No. 25, which would have instructed
the jury that it could consider whether the plaintiff failed to
mitigate his damages by not wearing his seatbelt.
6.

The Rio Grande is entitled to a new trial because

it was error for the lower court to dismiss co-defendant UDOT
prior to trial on the grounds of sovereign immunity.

Even if

this Court determines that the designation of a traffic control
device at a railroad crossing constitutes a "governmental
function," UDOT still should not have been dismissed because
said work does not constitute a "discretionary function"
involving basic state policy.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND THE JURY VERDICT FINDING THE PLAINTIFF TO
HAVE NO DEGREE OF FAULT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED.
Although the railroad believes it was not negligent in
this instance, such a conclusion is not necessary for a new
trial to be required.

Similarly, this Court need not conclude

the negligence of the plaintiff to have been equal to or
greater than any negligence of the railroad in order to resolve
this appeal.

In this instance, a jury found there to be no

negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

If this Court

concludes the evidence insufficient to support such a finding,
if the plaintiff was only 1% negligent, this case must be
remanded for a new trial.
Facts disputed by the plaintiff support a finding that
this accident resulted when the plaintiff ran a stop sign.
However, even if one were to ignore the investigating officer's
testimony concerning what the plaintiff told him immediately
after the accident, even if one were to accept completely the
testimony of the plaintiff, one is at most presented with facts
which have been held consistently by this Court to constitute
negligence as a matter of law.
According to the plaintiff, he knew on that clear
April morning that he was approaching a railroad crossing.
Indeed, he had been part of a paving crew that laid asphalt at
this crossing.

(R. 1748 and 1757).
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He saw all of the warning

signs and he saw the stop sign.

Even if he did stop for the

sign, his duty to yield the right of way to a train was only
beginning.
The obvious purpose of the stop sign at this crossing
is to force a motorist to stop before proceeding into the zone
of danger that is incidental to this crossing.

It is not there

to enable a motorist to disregard the crossing itself and any
trains in the area, so long as he stops for the sign.

The

testimony of all witnesses agreed that an eastbound motorist
stopped at the stop sign had a severely obstructed view to the
north, or the driver's left.

The view to the motorist's right

was relatively unobstructed.

It was also beyond dispute that a

motorist pulling forward from the stop sign would reach a point
where the view to his left (north) would become unobstructed
and, at that point, his vehicle would still be clear of any
danger from a passing train.

Even the plaintiff admitted that

had his vehicle been stopped when he first saw the train,
rather than moving forward, he would have avoided the collision
(R. 1775-76).
Had the plaintiff pulled forward slowly enough to stop
as soon as the view to his left became unobstructed, this
accident would not have happened.

Such conduct is what the law

requires, and it is the crossing itself which requires such
conduct, not the stop sign.

The stop sign requires a motorist

to stop at the sign; the crossing itself requires him to
control his vehicle and, if necessary, stop it at the point

-16-

where he can see that no train is within dangerous proximity t
the crossing.
"The law requires that a traveler, approaching a
railroad crossing, look and listen, and, if
necessary, stop to avoid being injured by
trains. This is his duty at all times and on
all occasions, whether his view be obstructed or
unobstructed, and the greater the hazard or
danger surrounding him, the greater is the care
required of him ." Lundguist v. Kennecott
Copper Co., Inc. 30 Utah 2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d
1182, 1184 (1973) (emphasis added). See also,
Steele v. D&RGW 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751,
754 (1964). Benson v. D&RGW, 4 Utah 2d 38,
41-42 286 P.2d 790, 792 (1955).
According to the plaintiff, he not only failed to sto
for the train, he drove forward from the stop sign while
looking to his right, the direction which had an unobstructed
view for about 900 feet down the track (R. 1759).

At the stop

sign, the plaintiff knew there was no train to his right
because his view in that direction was unobstructed.

From his

own testimony, he also knew that from there he could not see
more than 1-0 feet up the track to his left (R. 1759).
pulled forward looking to his rjLght (R. 1750).

He the

It is only

after he could no longer stop short of the tracks, that he
"glanced back to the left" and saw the train (R. 1750).
This testimony only permits two possible conclusions:
Either the plaintiff rolled through the stop sign glancing
left, then right, then left again without stopping and at an
unsafe rate of speed, or he stopped and proceeded slowly with
his eyes glued to his right for an inordinately long period of
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time when any danger had to come from his left.

Such conduct

has been held by this Court to be negligent as a matter of law.
Unlike the plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in
Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d
1182 (1973), was travelling toward an unfamiliar crossing.
Just as in this case, the view to his left, which was also
north, was "obstructed by an embankment."

30 Utah 2d at

263-64, 516 P.2d at 1183.
"He testified that as he proceeded to the
crossing he looked north and observed nothing
since the embankment extended approximately 10
feet north of the crossing. He looked in a
southerly direction, where his view was
unobstructed, and he saw nothing. As he looked
to the north again the train and vehicle
collided." Id.
The embankment which obstructed the driver's view to his left
extended to within 10 feet of the crossing, but, as here, the
plaintiff in Lundquist conceded that there was sufficient
space prior to crossing the tracks where a vehicle could stop,
and where the driver vould have a view up tht tracks to see a
train approaching from his left (north).
Even without the presence of a stop sign and even
though the Lundquist plaintiff was unfamiliar with the
crossing, the trial court found him negligent as a matter of
law.

The Utah Supreme Court noted that the railroad track

itself was a sufficient warning to require the plaintiff to
proceed to a point where his view was unobstructed and either
stop or so control his vehicle that a collision with any
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oncoming train could be avoided.

The summary judgment was

affirmed; the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law.
In the case of Steele v. The Denver & Rio Grande
Western Railroad Co., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964), the
plaintiff mistakenly proceeded onto a construction site where a
viaduct was being built over railroad tracks.

The point where

the temporary dirt road through the construction site crossed
the railroad tracks contained none of the usual railroad
crossing signs, although there was a sign which proclaimed
those entering the property to be trespassers.
A dirt "embankment" obscured vision at the
construction site, but the Supreme Court noted that the
motorist's "visibility was not obscured by the fill embankment
or any other condition within 10 feet of the track [and the
motorist] proceeded onto the track without stopping or
observing the approaching train."
added).

396 P.2d at 753

(emphasis

Although the operator of the automobile in Steele

claimed to be distracted by the hustle and bustle of the
construction site, the lower court found him negligent as a
matter of law7 and dismissed his action.

The Utah Supreme

Court affirmed.
Finally, in Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
Ill Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903 (1947), a plaintiff claimed weeds
and trees limited her view of an oncoming train to 100 feet up
the track.

The crossing involved in the Drummond case was

protected by what the Court described as an "automatic signal
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bell,f which the plaintiff said she stopped "alongside", even
though she claimed it was not ringing.
P.2d at 904.

Ill Utah at 292, 177

It was from this point that she asserted her view

to be obstructed.

She claimed the road bed from the point

adjacent to the automatic signal bell to the crossing to have
been unusually rough and that this condition occupied her
attention until she was too close to the tracks to avoid the
collision.

For the purpose of the appeal, the Supreme Court

assumed that the automatic crossing signal malfunctioned and
that the railroad was negligent.

Nevertheless, it affirmed the

lower court's finding that the plaintiff was negligent as a
matter of law.
"Having been fully aware of the conditions
confronting her in driving over this crossing, if
the road was such that it interfered with the
opportunity of looking while the car was in
motion, plaintiff could have stopped her car
closer to the track where visibility would have
been better and road conditions much less
important. . . The failure of the signal bell
was an invitation to her to proceed with due
care, but was not an invitation to proceed
without regard to other dangerous conditions then
existing that could have been ascertained by the
use of ordinary care." Ill Utah at 299-300, 177
P.2d at 908 (emphasis added).

It is interesting that the Supreme Court in Drummond
noted that one could see the top of the train over the top of
the weeds. In the present case, the plaintiff's own video tape
demonstrated that the tjsp of the train could be seen for
several hundred feet up the track to the driver's left (north)
even at the point where a driver must stop for the stop sign.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 47).
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Just as Mr. Gleave now claims, the plaintiff in
Drummond claimed she stopped at the point of a stop signal and
from that point her view was obstructed.

Then because the

electronic sign indicated a clear track and because the road
condition occupied her attention, she argued she should be
exonerated in proceeding over the crossing without again
stopping and looking for an approaching train.

The trial court

and the Supreme Court disagreed, finding such conduct negligent
as a matter of law.
"The time to look is when he is about to cross.
That is the time when he is about to encounter
the danger portended by a railroad crossing, and
it is not enough that he look at a point some
distance from the crossing when looking on nearer
approach would reveal danger." Ill P.2d at 298,
277 P.2d at 907 (quoting from Chicago, R.I.&P.R.
Co. v. Wheeler, 80 Kan. 187, 101 P. 1001 (1909).
In the present case, there is no claim of an
electronic signal failure, no claim of unfamiliarity with the
area, and no claim of construction work or other activity to
distract a motorist's attention.

If the plaintiff in Drummond

had to stop a second time, then so did Mr. Gleave.

If the

unmarked tracks in Steele required the plaintiff in that case
to stop within 10 feet of them in order to see around an
embankment, then the crossbucks at 1600 South in Springville
required no less of Mr. Gleave.

If the plaintiff in Lundquist

was negligent in looking mostly to the right as he approached a
crossing with an obstructed view to the left, then so was Mr.
Gleave.
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Very good reasons exist for granting railroad trains
the "unquestioned right of way" over automobiles at railroad
crossings.

Pippy v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 79 Utah

439, 451, 1 P.2d 305, 310 (1932).

Trains confine their

movements to the tracks, they are enormously heavy and
difficult to stop, they cannot swerve to avoid a collision and
they are certified as a public necessity anc' convenience.

See

e.g., Lundguist v. Kennecott Copper Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 516
P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973).
"If a traveler, by looking, could have seen an
approaching train in time to escape, it will be presumed, in
case he is injured by collision, either that he did not look,
or, if he did look, that he did not heed what he saw.
conduct is held negligence per se."

Such

Wilkinson v. Oregon

Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah 110, 116, 99 P. 466, 468 (1909)
(citing Mann v. Belt Railroad & Stock-Yard Co., 128 Ind. 138,
142, 26 N.E. 819, 820 (1891)).

Accord, Benson v. The Denver

and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 28 6 P.2d
790, 792 (1955); Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 103
Utah 274, 282, 135 P.2d 115, 119 (1943).
Plaintiff's own expert testified that the train would
have been plainly visible from a point of safety beyond the
stop sign (R. 1609), and the photographic exhibits clearly
demonstrate this fact (R. 1373, 1380, and defendant's Exhibits
27-33).

The plaintiff testified that had he been stopped where

he was when he first saw the train, the collision would not
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have occurred (R. 1775-76).

Plaintiff's video tape (Exhibit

No. 47) undeniably shows that a motorist stopped with the front
of his vehicle at the stop sign can see the headlight and the
top of a train approaching from the north (left) at 50 mph for
at least six seconds.

Even disregarding the train whistle, the

bell, and Mr. Gleave's confession to the police officer, he
simply did not see what was there to be seen from a point of
safety.

He violated the train's right of way, he ignored the

crossbucks and the tracks, and he drove to a point of danger
without even looking in the direction from which the danger
must come.
This Court has stated that a new trial must be ordered
if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking
or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict
plainly unreasonable and unjust."

Nelson v. Trujillo, 657

See also, Anderson v. Bradley,

P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982).

590 P. 2d 339, 342 (Utah 1979), and Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah
2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 (1958).

In this instance, not only is the

evidence to support a finding of no negligence on the part of
the plaintiff "unconvincing," even the plaintiff's own version
of the facts compels the conclusion that he was negligent as a
matter of law.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE
RIO GRANDE WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY.
Perhaps the most fundamental precept of our system of
trial by jury is the requirement that each and every member of
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the jury be impartial.

Despite voir dire, no one discovered

until after the trial that Juror Edna Argyle was so
well-acquainted with the plaintiff's witness, Dr. John
Mendenhall, that the Rio Grande did not enjoy its due process
right to an impartial jury.
This Court has stated that it is appropriate to order
a new trial when the voir dire of the prospective jurors fails
in its basic purpose of eradicating juror bias.

In Anderton v.

Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 1980), the Court stated:
"Trial by jury in civil cases is guaranteed
under the Utah Constitution. Moreover the
requirements of due process dictate that the jury
be impartial and unbiased. It is in furtherance
of these rights that voir dire examination of
prospective jurors before the beginning of trial
is engaged in. For the same reason, a trial
court may order a new trial should it appear that
juror bias crept into the proceedings
notwithstanding voir dire questioning." 607
P.2d at 835 (emphasis added).
As confirmed by the Affidavit of Edna Argyle (R.
779-800; also Addendum Exhibit " I " ) , Dr. Mendenhall surgically
implanted artificial knees in Juror Argyle.

Juror Argyle first

became aware that her physician was going to be a witness when
he took the stand to testify as part of the plaintiff's case.
Affidavit of Edna Argyle at 11 4.

Juror Argyle did not notify

the Court or the parties of her relationship with this witness
until after the trial was over.
5.

Affidavit of Edna Argyle at 11

The transcript of the voir dire (R. 1659-60) confirms

paragraph 2 of Juror Argyle's Affidavit that plaintiff's
counsel did not mention Dr. Mendenhall as a prospective witness
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during the voir dire of the jury.

Juror bias crept into the

proceeding because plaintiff's counsel failed to identify all
of his witnesses when asked to do so by the Court.
The relationship between Juror Argyle and Witness
Mendenhall was not a casual or insignificant acquaintance.
Rather, Dr. Mendenhall was Edna Argyle's personal physician and
surgeon.

Edna Argyle trusted and respected Dr. Mendenhall so

much that she was willing to allow him to perform major surgery
on her.

Affidavit of Edna Argyle at 11 3.

Although she

presumably tried to ignore her special relationship with one of
plaintiff's key witnesses, the appearance and possibility of
bias is too great to ignore.
In Anderton, supra, this Court stated:
"The evil to be avoided in any relationship
between juror and counsel is that of improper
bias or prejudice, which arises, not from the
fact of the relationship itself, but only from an
awareness thereof. Mr. Huber [i.e., the juror]
can hardly be suspected of inclining toward the
representations of Mr. Nebeker [i.e. the defense
counsel] due to a relationship existing between
the two of them of which neither was aware until
after the trial had finished. For this reason,
impartiality of the jury was undiminished by the
relationship, and no prejudicial error
occurred". 607 P.2d at 835 (emphasis added).
This Court in Anderton implied that a relationship
between a lawyer for one of the parties and a juror would be
prejudicial if the juror was aware of the relationship during
the trial.

A close relationship between a juror and the

plaintiff's principal physician seems no less significant.
Juror Argyle certainly was aware of her relationship with Dr.
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M e n d e n h a l l w h i l e h e w a s testifying on behalf of the plaintiff
and she exhibited this awareness w h i l e she w a s d e l i b e r a t i n g , as
indicated by h e r testimony that she m e n t i o n e d the fact of h e r
relationship w i t h the d o c t o r to h e r fellow j u r o r s .
A f f i d a v i t of Edna A r g y l e at UU 4 and 6.
problem.

See

This compounded the

T h e effect this h a d u p o n other jurors in their

d e l i b e r a t i o n c a n only increase the appearance of bias in this
case.
In State v. B r o o k s , 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , t h e
defendant w a s charged and convicted of aggravated robbery.

The

Brooks case explains w h y a j u r o r cannot be "impartial 1 1 w h e n
the j u r o r accords one of the p a r t i e s 1 w i t n e s s e s p a r t i c u l a r
respect or esteem.
" I m p a r t i a l i t y " is not a technical c o n c e p t i o n but
is a state of m i n d ; it is a m e n t a l attitude of
appropriate i n d i f f e r e n c e . . . A j u r o r , w h o
through personal a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h a witness or
party h a s developed a relationship of a f f e c t i o n ,
r e s p e c t , or esteem cannot be deemed disinterested, i n d i f f e r e n t , i m p a r t i a l .
k7h ?r e t he r e have been per so n aJl ass ociations ,
such a s _ _t h e^__o ne here, to remain uni n f luenced ,
unbiased, and unprejudiced; runs counter to
liyinAn J}^ 1 ^ 11 ^- 0 n e cannot be deemed indifferent
and impartial." 563 P.2d at 801-02 (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).
Even if, arguendo, Juror Argyle consciously tried to
be unbiased and impartial, it would be against her human nature
for her to ignore the fact that a person very highly regarded
by her had come forward as a witness in plaintiff's behalf.
Under such circumstances, Juror Argyle cannot be deemed to have
been "disinterested, indifferent, impartial."
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The Rio Grande and Utah Railway were each given three
peremptory challenges.

However, they only exercised five of

their possible six peremptories.

Even if Juror Argyle had

survived a challenge for cause, the Rio Grande and Utah Railway
could have exercised their sixth peremptory challenge on her.
Moreover, since there was an alternate juror who could have
replaced Juror Argyle, plaintiff counsel's mistake during voir
dire could have been corrected when Dr. Mendenhall came forward
to testify, but Juror Argyle chose not to inform the court of
her relationship with this witness.
Juror Argyle's vote was undeniably important to the
jury's verdict.

When polled, only six of the eight jurors

joined in the finding that plaintiff was 0% negligent; Juror
Argyle was one of the six.

(R. 1181-82).

Of course, the Rio

Grande would be entitled to a new trial even if Juror Argyle
had joined in a unanimous verdict.

See, Crawford v. Manning,

542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975).
This Court can determine by logic, based upon common
experience, that Mrs. Argyle's intimate association as a
patient of one of plaintiff's key witnesses prevented her from
standing in an "attitude of indifference" between plaintiff and
defendants.

Juror Argyle subconsciously or even consciously

associated her feelings of esteem for Dr. Mendenhall with the
merits of plaintiff's case.

Under such circumstances, even a

statement by a juror that she intends to be fair loses its
meaning.

See, Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah
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1981).

"The juror cannot be the judge of his qualifications;

this function is the responsibility of the trial court."

See

also, State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 882-84 (Utah 1981).
Although a new trial will involve some additional
expense and inconvenience to the parties, such must be borne to
preserve and protect the constitutional right to a trial by an
impartial jury.

The Rio Grande still has not had its day in

court.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE IT WAS
ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO DENY THE RIO
GRANDE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT
THE RIO GRANDE OWES NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF TO
PERFORM FUNCTIONS EXCLUSIVELY PREEMPTED BY UDOT
AND UPSC.
Before trial, the Rio Grande moved for partial summary
judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to submit
to the jury a theory that the Rio Grande owed him a duty to
redesign the landscape at the 1600 South crossing, provide
additional warning devices at the crossing, or slow its trains
to a speed below that which UDOT understood was the speed of
trains in this area (R. 460-63; 501-03; 2110-11; 2139-40).
lower court denied this motion (R. 569-70; 769-71; also
2
Addendum Exhibit

,f

D").

The Rio Grande also moved unsuccessfully for a new
trial based on the same grounds. (R. 825; 906).
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The

It was undisputed that UDOT evaluated the subject
crossing and took all of the factors extant at the crossing
into account in discharging its statutory obligation to mandate
the crossing protection at that location.

These factors

included the obstructed view caused by the hillside and the
rate of travel of trains through the crossing.

Arthur Geurts,

the Safety Studies Engineer for UDOT, testified that UDOT
considers many factors at each railroad crossing, including but
not limited to the volume and speed of both train and
automobile traffic, the number of tracks, the gradients in the
area, and the various sight distances (R. 981-92).

See also

the testimony of Joseph Bruce Yuhas (R. 1236-37).

After UDOT

evaluated all of the circumstances relevant to highway safety
at the 1600 South crossing, UDOT, pursuant to state law,
determined what warning devices were reasonable and appropriate
under those circumstances.

The Rio Grande does not have any

legal authority, and thus no duty, to second-guess UDOT.

As

such, it was error to allow the plaintiff to suggest to the
jury that the Rio Grande breached a common law duty owed to
plaintiff by not reshaping the contour of the earth in the
vicinity of the crossing and/or by not slowing its trains (R.
1113-14; 1155-56).
A•

The Statutory Framework

A series of related statutes in Chapter 4 of Title 54
of the Utah Code establish UDOT's authority to control traffic
safety at railroad crossings in Utah, subject only to UPSC
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review.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(1) (1953, as amended)

provides that a railroad-highway crossing cannot be built
"without the permission of the department of transportation
[UDOT] having first been secured" and that the department
"shall have the right to refuse its permission or to grant i
upon such terms and conditions as rt may prescribe."
(emphasis added).

Id.

Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2)

(1953, as amended) provides:
"The department [UDOT] shall i.cve the power
to determine and prescribe the manner, including
the particular point of crossing, and the terms
of installation, operation, maintenance, use and
protection of each crossing . . . of a public
road or highway by a railroad or street railroad,
. . . and to alter or abolish any such crossing
. . . and the proportions in which the expense of
the alteration or abolition of such crossings . .
. shall be divided between the railroad or
between such corporations and the state, county,
municipality or other public authority in
interest." (Emphasis added).
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(4), the Utah
Public Service Commission ("UPSCM) "shall retain exclusive
jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute by any person
aggrieved by any action of the department [UDOT]" taken
pursuant to Section 54-4-15.

I_d.

(Emphasis added).

The statewide duty of UDOT to regulate safety signa
or devices at railroad-highway crossings is expressly stated
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1:
"The department of transportation so as to
promote the public safety shall as prescribed in
this act provide for the installing, maintaining,
reconstructing, and improving of automatic and
other safety appliances, signals or devices at
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grade crossings on public highways or roads over
the tracks of any railroad or street railroad
corporation in the state.ft (Emphasis added).
Moreover, Section 54-4-15.3 provides that UDOT

ff

shall

apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance,
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices
described in section 54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street
railroad and the public agency involved."

Section 54-4-15.4

separately requires that the "department of transportation
shall provide in its annual budget for the costs incurred" to
install signals or other safety devices at railroad crossings.
B

•

The Authority of UDOT to Regulate Railroad
Crossings Is Exclusive.

Presumably, at the time when only horsedrawn vehicles
and early "horseless carriages" crossed over railroad tracks,
the railroads themselves installed whatever signs they chose to
at these crossings.

One can safely assume the crossing

protection signs of that era offered little consistency to the
highway traveller but, of course, the speed and range of
highway travel was substantially different from what it is
today.

In Utah, as elsewhere, government became increasingly

involved in the regulation of highway traffic as the speed and
number of vehicles increased.

In 1917, the Utah Legislature

enacted the predecessor of Section 15-4-15, and at that time
the predecessor of the Utah Public Service Commission [UPSC]
was granted: " . . . the exclusive power to determine and
prescribe the manner . . . and the terms of installation,
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operation, maintenance, use and protection . . .
crossing of a public road or a highway."
47-4-14.

of each

Laws of Utah 1917, §

(Emphasis added).
This language was held by the Utah Supreme Court to

mean just what it says in The Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 51 Utah
623, 172 Pac. 479 (1918), and later in Provo City v.
Department of Business Regulation, et al. 118 Utah 2d 1, 218
P.2d 675 (1950).

On both occasions, the power of the

designated state agency to "determine and prescribe" railroad
crossings was held to be exclusive.
city and state jurisdiction remained.

One limited area of joint
Prior to 1978, Utrl. Code

Ann. § 41-6-96 (1953) authorized cities to erect stop si, : at
railroad crossings within city limits, if they determined
to be necessary.

jch

In 1978, this statute was repealed and even

this limited authority by a local government was abolished.
The legislative intent could not be more clear.

Neither

railroads nor even local governments have the power to
prescribe what is to exist at public railroad crossings.

This

activity, including the determination and prescription of a~iy
signs or other devices installed to offer "protection" to a
motorist approaching such crossings, is to be done exclusively
by a state agency.
Section 54-4-15 was amended in 1975 in conjunction
with the creation of UDOT, which assumed some of the UPSC's
duties regarding railroad crossing safety.
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The only purpose

of the amendment was to substitute references to UDOT for the
prior references in the statutes to the UPSC.
Ann. § 54-4-15, Compiler's Notes (Supp. 1983).

See 6A Utah Code
A fourth

subsection was added to retain ultimate jurisdiction in the
UPSC to review the actions of UDOT.

The word "exclusive" was

transferred from the second subsection to the new fourth
subsection so as to accommodate the new scheme under which UDOT
has initial jurisdiction over railroad crossing protection,
subject to review only by the UPSC.

The joint jurisdiction of

these state agencies over the signs and control devices at
railroad crossings remains exclusive and a private party, such
as a railroad, has no more right to change the traffic
protection signs at a public railroad crossing, than it would
3
to change any other signs on a public highway.

The trial court ultimately recognized the exclusive nature
of UDOT's authority to design the crossing and mandate the
signs and devices which afford protection to motorists
approaching the crossing, although, as discussed in the
following text of Point III C, he incorrectly limited the scope
of this ruling. See Instruction 13, attached hereto as
Addendum Exhibit "0" and the text, infra. Although the Utah
Supreme Court has not been asked to consider the exclusive
nature of UDOTfs authority over railroad crossings since the
1975 amendment of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15, much litigation has
occurred in the United States District Court of Utah concerning
this issue and the federal district judges of this state have
uniformly interpreted Utah law to preclude railroads and local
governments from any authority or duty to change the crossing
protection at public crossings. See, e^g^, the Order of
Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins in D&RGW v. West Jordan Municipal
Corp., Civil No. 82-0344(D. Utah May 28, 1982), "attached
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "R"; the Order of Chief Judge Aldon
J. Anderson in Bellon v. D&RGW, Civil No. C83-0888A (D. Utah
Sept. 8, 1984), attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "Q"; and
the Order of Judge David K. Winder in Harsin v. D&RGW, Civil
No. C-83-0993W (D. Utah Jan. 10, 1985)"attached hereto as
Addendum Exhibit "K".
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C.

Any Change of Train Speeds or Sight Distances
Requires Reconsideration of the Crossing
Protection.

Since the mandated crossing protection is determined
by UDOT from factors such as view obstructions and train
speeds, any change of those factors presumably would require
new UDOT evaluation and perhaps different crossing protection.
The Rio Grande could not remove the hillside at 1600 South,
even if that were feasible, without notifying UDOT so that it
could come out and re-evaluate the crossing protection, since
it was the obstructed view caused by the hillside, among other
factors, which led UDOT to mandate the particular traffic signs
which existed at this crossing.

A similar situation exists

with respect to changes in train speeds in the area.
In determining how highway traffic is to be regulated,
UDOT operates with the twin goals of traffic flow efficiency
and traffic safety.
inconsistent.

To some extent, these goals are inherently

For example, if the speed limit on Utah ? s

interstate highways were reduced from 55 mph to 25 mph, they no
doubt would be safer, but the effect upon traffic flow
efficiency would be disastrous.

It is for this reason that

traffic control, including the traffic control at any
particular railroad crossing, is vested exclusively with a
single state agency.

Hopefully, this will result in some

consistency so that a motorist will confront the same type of
signs or other warning devices at crossings with essentially
the same type of hazards, regardless of who owns the railroad
tracks.

Changing the hazard rating of a crossing, either by
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erecting structures which obstruct the motorists' view of the
tracks or by removing them, without changing the crossing
protection, subverts the purpose of the Legislature every bit
as much as changing the signs.
The same is true with respect to changes in the speed
of trains passing through any particular crossing.

A crossing

which the State, in its exercise of exclusive authority,
determines to be properly protected by a simple crossbuck sign,
may require flashing lights and gates if the railroad decides
to raise the speed of its trains in the area from 50 to 90
mph.

Conversely, the goals of traffic flow efficiency and

state-wide uniformity may have resulted in UDOT removing the
rather extraordinary measure of a stop sign at the 1600 South
crossing if the railroad had reduced the speed of its trains in
4
that area to something below 50 mph.
The point to be made is that the exclusive authority
and duty to determine crossing protection is inextricably tied
to the factors upon which those decisions are made.

The

railroad certainly had a duty not to change those factors so as
to make the crossing more dangerous than UDOT thought it was
when it determined the existing crossing protection.

See e.g.

The UDOT Safety Engineer, Arthur Geurts, testified, for
example, that nothing more than a 20 mph change in the speed of
trains in the area (from 70 mph to 50 mph) would change the
hazard rating of this particular crossing from one that would
rank it as the 68th most dangerous crossing to one that would
rank it 353rd most dangerous (R. 982,989-91).
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Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R. Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d
163 (1951).

Had it done so, it undoubtedly would have been

obligated to inform UDOT of the change.

Similarly, if the

railroad chose to do something to make the 1600 South crossing
more safe, such as reduce its train speeds, it would have been
obligated to so inform UDOT, so that changes in the crossing
protection could be considered by the State agency.

However,

so long as the railroad was operating at the speeds which UDOT
evaluated in determining the crossing protection for motorists
such as Mr. Gleave, and so long as the motorists' view at 1600
South was not obstructed by the railroad any more than UDOT
understood it to be when it evaluated the crossing, then the
railroad violated no duty owed to motorists approaching that
crossing.

The agency with the exclusive authority and duty to

establish the appropriate protection for motorists had
evaluated those factors in determining what protection would be
afforded to motorists approaching that crossing.
had no duty to change those factors.

The railroad

Indeed, it had a duty

not to change them.
The lower court recognized the exclusive authority of
UDOT to determine the design of the crossing and the crossing

In Toomer, a temporary hazard, unknown to the State
agency which determined crossing protection, was created by the
railroad when it parked a large train on a siding and thereby
blocked the view of the mainline tracks to oncoming motorists.
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protection at 1600 South.

See the first paragraph of

Instruction No. 13, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "0".
However, he incorrectly instructed the jury that it could
consider whether or not the Rio Grande should have exercised
greater caution in approaching the 1600 South crossing because
a reasonable man may have thought the crossing protection to be
inadequate.

Instruction No. 6, paragraph (b), attached hereto

as Addendum Exhibit "P", and the second paragraph of
Instruction No. 13.
This suggested that the Rio Grande could second guess
the State agency and it invited the jury to consider the train
speed even though there was no claim that the speed of this
train was in excess of what UDOT expected it to be when it
determined the crossing protection for this crossing.

In

closing argument, the plaintiff's counsel was permitted to
argue that the railroad was negligent in not removing the
hillside to improve a motorist's view of the tracks, and in not
reducing the speed of its trains (R. 1113-14; 1155-56).
was prejudicial error.

This

Since the jury may have determined the

railroad to be negligent for one of these improper reasons, a
new trial is required.
POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF
PLAINTIFF COUNSEL'S SURPRISE AND IMPROPER
REFERENCE TO WOODARD'S TESTIMONY IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT.
One of the witnesses called to the stand by plaintiff
was a man named Willis J. Woodard.
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Mr. Woodard was a Rio

Grande employee who was working on the train which collided
with plaintiff's vehicle.

By the time of trial, Mr. Woodard

had been fired from his job at the Rio Grande for engaging in,
and concealing, criminal activities.

In fact, Mr. Woodard was

an inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time of trial.
Plaintiff counsel's direct examination of Mr. Woodard drew a
strenuous objection by counsel for the Rio Grande when
plaintiff's counsel began to impeach Mr. Woodard, even though
Mr. Woodard was plaintiff's own witness and had not said
anything to surprise plaintiff's counsel.

(R. 1788-90)

Furthermore, based upon written communications received by the
Rio Grande from Mr. Woodard, it was evident that Mr. Woodard
had offered to give testimony favorable to the Rio Grande if it
promised to reemploy him and unfavorable testimony if it
refused to guarantee him a job at the end of his prison term.
The Rio Grande had refused to give Mr. Woodard the employment
he was seeking to extort.
tf M

N )

(R. 2083-84; also Addendum Exhibit

Because Mr. Woodard could not be trusted to tell the

truth, the Rio Grande decided not to call him as a witness,
even though his deposition testimony had been very favorable to
the railroad.

(R. 1789).

During a lengthy conference outside the presence of
the jury (R. 1788-1808), it became clear that counsel for the
plaintiff was aware of Mr. Woodard's attempt to extort a job
from the Rio Grande even before he called him as a witness (R.
1791-1792, 1798-99, 2083-89, and Addendum Exhibit "N".)
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Plaintiff's counsel intended to use Mr. Woodard1s extortion
communications with the Rio Grande to impeach Mr. Woodard,
even though Mr. Woodard was a witness who was not to be called
by the Rio Grande and who, in fact, was being called by the
plaintiff.
Ruling on the Rio Grande's objection to plaintiff's
proposed continued examination of Mr. Woodard, the Court
ordered plaintiff's counsel to terminate the direct examination
of Mr. Woodard and he ordered Mr. Woodard to be excused
immediately from the witness stand.

As a result of this order,

counsel for the Rio Grande, of course, had no opportunity to
cross-examine Mr. Woodard.

The Rio Grande had no objection to

dismissing Mr. Woodard from the stand during Mr. Woodard's
direct testimony (i.e., without cross-examination) because the
Rio Grande understood that Mr. Woodard's testimony was stricken
and that counsel for all parties--including plaintiff--would
not argue any of Mr. Woodard's testimony to the jury.

(R.

1803).
To the great surprise and detriment of the Rio Grande,
counsel for the plaintiff did argue to the jury, during the
rebuttal portion of his closing argument, certain testimony
given by Mr. Woodard concerning a critical question of the
litigation (R. 1151-52).

Specifically, Mr. Woodard had given

testimony which could be construed by the jury to mean that the
Rio Grande's engineer had not sounded the whistle a full

-39-

one-quarter mile prior the crossing.

See Curtis v. Harmon

Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1975).

For the reasons

stated above, the Rio Grande never had an opportunity to
cross-examine Mr. Woodard regarding the estimate of distance
offered by him as to the point where the engineer first sounded
the whistle.
Counsel for the plaintiff improperly called a witness,
not for his testimony, but merely to impeach him and demonstrate to the jury that the railroad had employed a "bad man"
who attempted extortion.

Counsel then used the testimony which

had not been subject to cross-examination as a rebuttal point
in closing argument.

The adequacy of the whistle signal was a

critical issue for the jury to determine and offering and
arguing this witness' testimony was prejudicial as well as
questionable attorney conduct.

Since ordinary prudence by the

Rio Grande could not have guarded against plaintiff counsel's
surprise use of Mr. Woodard's testimony in his rebuttal
argument, and since the jury may have based its finding of
negligence against the Rio Grande on Mr. Woodard's stricken
testimony, the appropriate remedy is to order a new trial.
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POINT V
THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE IT WAS
AN ERROR FOR THE COURT NOT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT IT COULD CONSIDER WHETHER PLAINTIFF FAILED
TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES BY NOT WEARING HIS SEAT
BELT.
During the trial, plaintiff testified that he was not
wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident.
(Tr. 98).

(R. 1750)

Sergeant Coron testified that the passenger

compartment of the vehicle was structurally intact after the
collision.

(R. 1426-27).

The Rio Grande further established

through the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician that
substantially all of plaintiff's injuries were consistent with
injuries sustained by plaintiff upon coming into contact with
the ground after being thrown from the vehicle.

(R. 1209-10).

At the close of the evidence, the Rio Grande asked for Jury
Instruction No. 25 which would have instructed the jury that it
could reduce any damages awarded to plaintiff if it found that
plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages by not wearing a
seat belt (R. 702; and Addendum Exhibit " L " ) .

The instruction

was refused and the Rio Grande took exception to the Court's
refusal (R. 1159).
It was error for the trial court to deny this
instruction.

Shortly before trial, the Utah Supreme Court had

ruled that facts concerning the failure of a plaintiff to
fasten his seat belt presents an issue of mitigation failure.
See

> Acculog v. Peterson, No. 18133 slip op. (Utah May 1,

1984).

The Rio Grande had introduced sufficient evidence to
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warrant such an instruction and to argue that theory to the
jury.

The Rio Grande was prejudiced by being prevented from

arguing that plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages,
particularly in light of the jury's significant damage award of
$425,140.00.
POINT VI
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ON
GROUND'S OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Prior to trial, defendant Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
as against UDOT on the grounds that UDOT was immune from suit
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
granted UDOT's motion.

The lower court

In so ruling, the lower court stated:

"The motion of defendant Department of
Transportation to dismiss is granted. The court
is of the opinion that the decision of whether or
not to install a safety signal at a particular
crossing is a discretionary one protected by the
Governmental Immunity Act. See also Section
63-30-22 with respect to punitive damages.'1
Rulings of Judge Christensen dated May 29, 1984
(R. at 569-70; also Addendum Exhibit " D " ) .
The Rio Grande objected to UD0Tfs Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act does not
immunize UDOT from suit under the facts and circumstances of
this case.

(R. 508-513; 769-71; 2134-35)

The full text of the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act is attached hereto as Addendum
Exhibit "H".
The tenth cause of action in plaintiff's Amended
Complaint alleges that UDOT has the duty under Utah Code Ann.

-42-

§§ 54-4-14 et^ seg. to install, maintain, reconstruct and
improve safety devices and signals at the crossing where
plaintiff had this accident, and that UDOT breached its duty of
care by failing "to provide for adequate safety signals or
devices."

See Amended Complaint at 1T1T 82-83 (R. at 343-44;

also Addendum Exhibit " G " ) .

To the extent that plaintiff was

entitled to submit his case against the Rio Grande to the jury,
so too were the plaintiff and the Rio Grande entitled to submit
their respective theories of negligence against UDOT to the
jury.

The lower court completely misunderstood and misapplied

the sovereign immunity provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act in dismissing UDOT.
A•

Summary of the Two Tier Analytical Framework
Applicable to Cases Involving the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act

A claim of governmental immunity in any given case
presents two questions under the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act

-

See, e.g., Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d

432, 433-34 (Utah 1981).

The first question is whether the

activity in question constitutes a so-called "governmental
function."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 provides in pertinent part:

"Except as may otherwise be provided in this Act,
all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function. . . ." Id.
If the particular governmental activity does not
constitute a "governmental function,,f then the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has no application to the case and the
plaintiff is entitled to go forward with his action against the
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governmental entity.

Cf., Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban

Sanitary District, 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984).

If, however, the

activity in question does constitute a "governmental
function," then the second question is whether the Legislature
has waived immunity from suit for conduct in connection with
that specific governmental function.
B.

UDOT'S Regulation of Traffic Warning Devices
At Railroad Crossings Is Not a "Governmental
Function" Within the Purview of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act and, Therefore,
UDOT Is Not Immune From Suit

The lower court improperly dismissed UDOT from this
proceeding.

The installation or failure to install certain

traffic control devices at a particular railroad crossing is
not a "governmental function" as that term has been
consistently defined by the Utah Supreme Court since 1980.

In

the watershed governmental immunity case of Standiford v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Court declared:
"We therefore hold that the test for determining
governmental immunity is whether the activity
under consideration is of such a unique nature
that it can only be performed by a governmental
agency or that it is essential to the core of
governmental activity. Clearly this standard
broadens governmental liability." Id. at
1236-37 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court in Standiford held the operation of
a public golf course rurt to be a "governmental function"
within the purview of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and

-44-

this Court has expressly adhered to the Standiford definition
of "governmental function" in several other cases.
The installation of highway warning devices at
railroad crossings is not as "of such a unique nature that it
can only be performed by a governmental agency," and the
installation of traffic warning devices at railroad crossings,
while desirable, is not "essential to the core of governmental
activity."

Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37.

Although the Rio

Grande does contend in Point III, supra, that the State has
elected to preempt the field of railroad crossing protection,
it could have been otherwise, and it was prior to the time when
the State preempted the field.

Thus, although traffic

protection at railroad crossings is something the State has
elected to do exclusively, it is not something that the
"government alone must do."

Johnson, 629 P.2d at 434.

S^e , e^g^, Thomas v. ClearfieId City, 642 P.2d 737,
738-39 (Utah 1982) (holding that operation of a municipal sewer
system is not a "governmental function" within the purview of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act); Johnson v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 433-34 (Utah 1981) (holding that
municipal maintenance of a winter recreational facility was not
a "governmental function" within the purview of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, and stating, with emphasis in the
original, that, "The first part of the Standiford testactivity of such a unique nature that it can only be performed
by a governmental agency--does not refer to what government
may do, but to what government alone must do."); See also,
Comment, De_f in i ng Gov eminent a 1 Func t ion Und e r_ the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, 9~ J. CONTEMP. LAW 193, 198-203
(1983).
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C.

The Lower Court Erroneously Relied On The
"Discretionary Function" Exception

The mistake made by the lower court in evaluating the
sovereign immunity question is that it assumed the installation
of highway warning devices at a railroad crossings to
constitute a "governmental function."

Rather than focusing

first on the "governmental function" question, the lower court
mistakenly assumed the existence of a "governmental function,"
then proceeded to focus upon whether the activity was or was
not "discretionary" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10(l)(a) (1953, as amended).

That statute provides

that a governmental entity may not be sued for negligence, in
the exercise of a "governmental function", if the negligence
"arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not
the discretion is abused."

Id.

Since the governmental activity in question in this
case is not a "governmental function," it is not necessary to
determine whether the activity is or is not "discretionary."
However, even if the design and installation of traffic warning
devices at railroad crossings constitutes a "governmental
function," that activity is not a "discretionary function" as
that term has been interpreted by this Court.
In Bigelow & Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), the
Utah Supreme Court expressly held that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act did not bar a suit filed against the State of Utah
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by a plaintiff injured in an automobile accident allegedly
caused by a negligently designed traffic control system.

In so

holding, the Court explained:
According to the definition of discretion
established in Frank v. State, Utah 613 P.2d 517
(1980), a discretionary function under
§ 63-30-10(1) is ,fconfined to those decisions and
acts occurring at the 'basic policy making
level,' and not extended to those acts and
decisions taking place at the operational level,
or, in other words, . . . 'those which concern
routine, everyday matters, not requiring
evaluation of broad policy factors.'" Although
the acts of the State involved in designing the
traffic control system involve some degree of
discretion, as do almost all acts, the design of
the traffic control system does not involve the
ty
basic policy making leveltT. 618 P. 2d at 53
(emphasis added). Accord, Little v. Utah State
Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983) (defining "discretionary function").
In this case, as in Bigelow, governmental immunity
does not obtain because UD0T f s regulation and design of the
crossing where Mr. Gleave had his accident was an operational
level decision, not a basic policy decision of the State of
Utah.
In the lower court proceeding, UDOT relied heavily on
the case of Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 24 Utah
2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), for the proposition that Mr.
Gleave's suit was barred by Section 63-30-10(1)(a).

In

Velasquez, a passenger in a pickup truck which was involved in
an accident with a train at a railroad crossing, sued the State
of Utah Public Service Commission.

The lower court entered

summary judgment in favor of Commission and the passenger
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appealed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that under the

applicable statutes, the Public Service Commission had
discretionary power to require the railroad to construct and
maintain appropriate safety devices at a grade crossing, and
the commission was immune from suit by the passenger.
The Rio Grande submits that Velasquez has been
overruled sub silentio by Standiford and its progeny and/or
by Bigelow.

To the extent that Velasquez represents a

position contrary to the position asserted by the Rio Grande in
this case, the Velasquez opinion should be expressly
overruled.

The Court in Velasquez made the same mistake as

the lower court in this case.

That is, the Velasquez Court

failed to first determine whether the activity in question was
or was not a "governmental function."

Under the definition of

"governmental function" articulated in Standiford and its
progeny, the Velasquez holding must be overruled.

The

Velasquez holding must also be overruled in light of the
"discretionary function" cases subsequently decided by this
Court, such as Bigelow and Little.

7

Cf., Hobbs v. The D.&R.G.W.R. Co. and the Utah Dept. of
Transp^, 6 77 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1984). Hobbs was decided
subsequent to the Standiford decision and in Hobbs UDOT was
named a party upon a claim it had negligently routed traffic
over a certain railroad crossing during the upgrade
construction of a different crossing. The case was tried and
appealed and no issue of sovereign immunity was ever recognized,
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D.

The Rio Grande Was Prejudiced at Trial By
UDOT'S Absence From the Courtroom

The Rio Grande is entitled to have a jury evaluate
simultaneously the comparative negligence, if any, of both the
Rio Grande and UDOT.

By submitting the matter to the jury

without even having UDOT present in the courtroom, and thereby
preventing both plaintiff and the Rio Grande from trying the
issue of UDOT's comparative negligence, if any, the Rio Grande
was prejudiced.

The Rio Grande was particularly prejudiced by

UDOT f s dismissal in light of the Court's holding in Jensen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984)
that, in a multi-defendant case, Utah's Comparative Negligence
Act requires the total negligence of all the defendants to be
compared to that of the plaintiff to determine whether a
particular defendant is liable.

Prejudice against the Rio

Grande was further compounded by the lower court's refusal to
even read to the jury, the Rio Grande's requested Jury
Instruction No. 29 which would have instructed the jury that
the Rio Grande could not be held liable for any perceived
errors or omissions by UDOT (R. /06; 1159; also Addendum
Exhibit " M " ) .
CONCLUSION:

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse
the judgment entered by the lower court, reinstate the Amended
Complaint as against co-defendant UDOT, and remand for a new
trial.

During the new trial, the jury should be instructed
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that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, with the
jury to determine the degree to which plaintiff's negligence
and the negligence, if any, of the Rio Grande and UDOT
proximately caused this accident.
DATED this /Z

^~~day of March, 1985.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Michael F. Richman
Patrick J. O'Hara

P. 0. Box 45340
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84145
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Utah Railway Company
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ADDENDUM
Attached hereto are the following exhibits:
EXHIBIT "A":
198A (R. 765-68).

Special Verdict Form dated June 18,

EXHIBIT "B":
15, 1984 (R. 808-09).

The Judgment entered on or about August

EXHIBIT "C": Rulings dated October 16, 1984
(regarding denial of the Rio Grande's post-trial motions) (R.
906).
EXHIBIT "D": Rulings dated May 29, 1984 (denying the
Rio Grande's summary judgment motion and partial summary
judgment motion; also granting dismissal of Utah Department of
Transportation (R. 569-70).
EXHIBIT "E": Order Granting Directed Verdict
Regarding Punitive Damages dated August 15, 1984 (R. 806).
EXHIBIT "F":
(R. 912-13).

Notice of Appeal dated November 9, 1984

EXHIBIT "G": Paragraphs 81-86 of the Amended
Complaint--Tenth Cause of Action Against Utah Department of
Transportation (R. 343-44).
EXHIBIT "H": Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1953, as amended).
EXHIBIT "I": Affidavit of Edna Argyle (R. 779-800).
EXHIBIT "J": Investigating Officer's Report of the
Gleave Accident (Defendants' Trial Exhibit 34).
EXHIBIT "K": "Order Stating Uncontested and
Contested Facts and Granting Partial Summary Judgment in Favor
of Defendant" dated January 10, 1985 in Harsin v. Denver and
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., Civil No. C-83-0993W (D. Utah
1985) ("Winder, J . ) .
EXHIBIT "L" The Rio Grande's Requested Jury
Instruction No. 25 (R. 702) (regarding the seat belt issue)
(refused by the lower court June 18, 1984).
EXHIBIT "M": The Rio Grande's Requested Jury
Instruction No. 29 (R. 706) (regarding UDOT's comparative
negligence) (refused by the lower court June 18, 1984).
A-l

EXHIBIT "N": Letter to Willis Woodard from E. Scott
Savage at Van Cott, Bagley dated March 3, 1984 (R. 2083-84) and
part of letter from Willis Woodard to the Rio Grande dated
February 15, 1984 (R. 2086).
EXHIBIT "0":

Jury Instruction No. 13 (R. 737).

EXHIBIT "P": Jury Instruction No. 6 (R. 729-30).
EXHIBIT "Q": Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co. v. Bellon, Civil No. C83-0888A (D. Utah September 8, 1984)
(Anderson, J.) ("Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment").
EXHIBIT "R": Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co. v. West Jordan Municipal Corp., Civil No. 82-0344J (D.
Utah May 28, 1982) (Jenkins, J.) ("Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law").
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IN THE D I S T R I C T

R O B E R T L.

COURT

OF UTAH

M 20 a 3 36

COUNTY, STATE OF»UTAH. -

CLEAVE,
Civil

Plaintiff,

No.

SPECIAL

vs

62912

VERDICT

DENVER & RIO G R A N D E WESTERN
R A I L R O A D C O M P A N Y , et a l ,
Defendants.

LADIES

AND

GENTLEMEN

Please

answer

the

OF THE

following

preponderance

of tne e v i d e n c e .

preponderates

in

favor

"yes".

If, on any

equally

balanced

QUESTION

the

If you

the issue

tnat you cannot

issue

questions

i s s u e , you find

of the e v i d e n c e , or
against

of

JURY:

if you

find

fine

the

the

evidence

answer

the e v i d e n c e

determine

p r e s e n t e d , answer

that

presented,

that

that

from a

it

is so

preponderance

the e v i d e n c e

preponderates

it " n o . "

ONE:

(a)

Wa:

plaintiff

A N 3 \\ E R

(b)

oc

Robert G l e a v e

negligent?

•

If 1(a) is "yes," was such negligence a
pi'^.a^aie cause of the injuries

sustained

cy plaintiff Robert Gleave?

A N S v! E R

f

i<\°) -

EXHIBIT

"Af

7*>

(2)
QUESTION TWO:
(a)

Were defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad and Utah Railway Company negligent?
yes,

ANSWER
(b)

If 2(a) is "yes," was such negligence a
proximate cause of the injuries received by
plaintiff Robert Gleave?
ANSWER

yycs
—/

. . .

QUESTION THREE:
If you have answered

Questions 1 and 2 affirmatively

and have found that plaintiff Robert Gleave and the defendants
railroads were negligent in a way that caused plaintiff
Robert GleaveTs injuries, then, and only then, answer the
following question:
Considering all of the negligence of defendants
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company and Utah Railway
Company that you found to be a cause of

plaintiff Robert

Gleave's injuries and all of the negligence of plaintiff
Robert Gleave that you found to be a cause of plaintiff Robert
Gleave's own injuries to total 100%, you will now allocate the
V 0 , r.egij 'ence Detween tne negligent parties.

You will

weigh the negligence of each party against the negligence
of the other party and determine the relative negligence

(3)
of each party in relation to the negligence of the other party
or parties.

Your answer in percentages will reflect your decision.

What part of the 100% do you find to be attributable to:
(a)

(b)

Defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company and Utah Railway Company

%

Plaintiff Robert Gleave

%

Total must be 100%
QUESTION FOUR:
Considering only the instructions and evidence concerning
damages, and without being concerned with the effect of fault
of any party on damages in answering this question, what
amount of money would fairly and adequately compensate
plaintiff Robert Gleave for any and all injuries sustained
by him as a result of the collision at issue?
If you have answered Question 3, and if Mr. Gleave is
entitled to have the amount of damages reduced because of the
percentage of negligence allocated by you to Mr. Gleave,
that computation will be made by the Court.

Therefore, do

no make any reduction in your answer to this question.
$ ^) (s> p c c

A.

Fast medical expenses

5.

Future medical -xpenses$ ^ ^

C.

Past lost wages

D.

Loss of future earnings
and earning capacity
$ (^} *7 5

;

jj c(O

;

$ Q O, O Q O

;

CJ O o

;

7V>;

(J»)

General damages to include
pain and suffering and loss
_
of enjoyment of life
$ £) Q
Reasonable market value
of Robert Gleave ? s
automobile on the date of
the collision
TOTAL

$

OQO

-2

^

) Co OO

$ ^ P S ~ / <-/Q

Dated this jj£__ day of June, 1984.

C&^J2±*, /X,

C^,v ^ v \ y

JURY FOREMAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

1

JUDGMENT

DENVER S. RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
GERALD H. BURTON, an
]
individual, CITY OF
SPRINGVILLE, a Municipal
i
Civil No. 62912
corporation, and STATE OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
; (Judge Cullen Y. Christensen
Defendants.
This action came on for jury trial on June 11,
1984 through June 18, 1984, Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen,
District Judge, presiding.

The

issues having been duly

tried, and the jury having duly rendered itB verdict.
It is ordered
Robert Gleave, recover

and

adjudged

that the plaintiff

from the defendants Denver & Rio

Grande Western Company and Utah Railway Company jointly and
severally, the sum of $425,140.00, with interest as provided
by law and the costs of action.

EXHIBIT "B"

Judgment pursuant to further order of the Court:
A.

Jury Verdict

$ 425,140.00

B.

Pre-Judgment interest on
special damages (§78-27-44

U.C.A.)
(Rule

%/*/

C.

Costs

D.

I n t e r e s t a t 12% on $ 4 2 5 , 1 4 0 . 0 0

I7JSI

54(e))

Out* /sr /9tjf

^

from Jur^- 10, 190H to date of
satisfaction of judgment
(§15-1-4 U.C.A.)

TOTAL
DATED t h i s JS"'

day of

&tf-4U>tf

BY THE COURT:

Honorab

%*/3%937.11
,1984.

IN THE DISTJtfCT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY1. STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 62,912
vs.
RULINGS
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD CO., et al
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court under Rule 2.8 of the Rules of
Practice on various motions as hereinafter set forth. The Court has reviewed
the file, the affidavits and memorandum filed on behalf of the respective
parties, and upon being fully advised in the premises now makes the following
RULINGS
1.

The Motion of Defendants D&RGW and Utah Railway for a new trial

is denied.
2.

The Motion of said defendants to alter or amend the Judgment 1s

3.

The Motion of said defendants for a Judgment not withstanding the

denied.

Verdict is denied.
4. The plaintiff's Motton for award of attorney fees under Sec 78-27-56
UCA 1s denied.
Dated this 16th day of October, 1984.

BY THE COURT

t/////^*/ (cpAv^tfo^^
CULLEN Y//HRISTENSEN, JUDGE

cc:

to counsel
EXHIBIT "CM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 62912

vs.

RULINGS

D & RGW RAILROAD COMPANY,
et al, Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court under Rule 2.8
on plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment, the motion

of aefendant Utah Department of Transportation

to

dismiss, the motion of defendants D&RGW Railroad
Utah Railway and Burton for summary

Company,

judgment,

defendant D&RGW Railroad Company's motion for independent
physical, plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, defendant D&RGW Railroad

Company's

motion to strike affidavits, plaintiff's motion to determine
sufficiency of response to request for admissions, and
plaintiff's motion to compel
reviewed

discovery.

The Court has

the file, the affidavits and memoranda of authority

filed by the various parties, and upon being advised

in the

premises now makes the following
RULING
1.

Plaintiff's motion for summary

2.

The motion of defendant Department of Transportation

EXHIBIT "D"

judgment is denied.

(Rulings)

(2)

to dismiss is granted*

The Court is of the opinion

that the decision of whether or not to install a safety signal
at a particular crossing is a discretionary one protected
by the Governmental Immunity Act.

See also Section 63-30-22

with respect to punitive damages.
3.

The motion of defendant D&RGW Railroad Company,

Utah Railway and Burton for summary judgment or partial
summary judgment is denied.
4.

The motion of defendant D&RGW Railroad Company

for an independent physical is granted.

The Court has been

informed that the plaintiff has no objection.
5.

Plaintifffs motion for leave to file a second amneded

complaint is denied.
6.

The motion of defendant D&RGW Railroad Company

to strike affidavits is denied.
7.

Plaintiff's motion to determine the sufficiency

of the response to plaintiff's first set of requests for
admissions is denied.

(See Scheduling Order filed December

^^1 198A.)
8.

Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is denied.

(See Scheduling Order filed December 14, 1983 - )
—00O00—

Dated thisc/?-

day of May 1984.

ullen,-^.
cc :

to counsel

Christensen,

Judge

'.*[/

m

M)5

ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915

AM 10: 54

^'W.HUISH.CURK
— OtPl'Ty

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING
DIRECTED VERDICT
REGARDING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

vs.
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
GERALD H. BURTON, an
individual, CITY OF
SPRINGVILLE, a Municipal
corporation, and STATE OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Civil No. 62912

(Judge Cullen Y. Christensen)

Defendants.
At the close of plaintiff's case
defendant

moved

for

an

order

granting

(June 18, 1984),

a directed

verdict

with respect to the issue of punitive damages.
For reasons set forth in the record, the directed
verdict is granted with respect to punitive damages only.
The issue of compensatory

damages is

specifically

reserved for the jury.
DATED this

fS-

UNday of

District Judge
EXHIBIT "E*

, 1984.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Michael F. RIchman
Patrick J. O'Hara
Attorneys for The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, Gerald H.
Burton, and Utah Railway Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff,

)

]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a corporation,
GERALD H. BURTON, an
individual, CITY OF
SPRINGVILLE, a municipal
corporation, and STATE OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Civil No. 62912

Defendants.
Please take notice that defendants The Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company and Utah Railway Company hereby
appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the
judgment entered against them in the above entitled matter on

EXHIBIT "F

August 15, 1984 and from the District Court's denial of said
defendants' post-judgment motions.
DATED this

/ " day of November, 1984.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL k MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Michael F. Richman
Patrick J. O'Hara

By y&tJz j . flicks

Attorneys for Defendants
The Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, Utah Railway
Company, and Gerald H. Burton
P. 0. Box 3400
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT
84110-3400
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

-2-

79.
of

As a direct and proximate result of defendant City

Springvillefs

aforesaid

breach

of

duty, plaintiff

has

suffered substantial injuries as alleged herein.
80.

On

or

about

the

date

of

September

23, 1982,

plaintiff served a Notice of Claim upon defendant City of
Springville
(1953,

as

as

required

amended);

a

by

§63-30-11

copy

of

attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

such

Utah Code Annotated
Notice

of

Claim

is

Defendant has refused to

honor plaintiff's claim.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
81.

Plaintiff realleges every allegation contained in

paragrapi :^ 1 through

80 above, and

incorporates

the same

herein b" reference.
82.

The defendant Department of Transportation, State

of Utah (hereinafter "State of

Utah"), pursuant to §54-4-14,

et seq., Utah Code Annotate^

(1953, as amended), has the

duty

to provide

tor the installation, maintenance, recon-

struction and improvement of safety signals or devices at
the railroaa crossing that is the subject of this action, at
1600 Soutr in Springville.
83.

The aetendant

State of Utah, knew of or

have known of the unreasonably

should

dangerous condition at the

lbUO South railrocc crossing *nd failed to provide for the
installation of adequate safety signals or devices, thereby
breaching its dut> as provided by statute.
84.

The acts of defendant, State of Utah, complained

of hoToan constitute negliaonce.

EXHIBIT "G"

85.
State

of

As

a

direct

Utah's

and

aforesaid

proximate

result

breach

duty, plaintiff

of

of

defendant
has

suffered substantial injuries as alleged herein.
86.

On

or

about

the

date

of

September

23, 1982,

plaintiff served a Notice of Claim upon defendant State of
Utah, as required by §63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, (1953,
as amended) ; a copy of
hereto

as

Exhibit

such Notice of Claim

"B".

Defendant

has

is attached

failed

to

honor

p 1 c I n t I i *f s c 1 a im.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
87.

At

Sprinqville
lC(rj

all
had

times
a

alleged

stop

sign

herein, defendant
situated

16f

West

City

of

of

the

Soutn Railroad Crossing.
88.

unable

tc

From

the point

see

any

of that

southbound

stop

train

sign, a driver

until

that

train

is
is

13"7' from the intersection.
89.

Defendant

speed limit of fifty
crossing.

Denver

& Rio Grande has established a

(50) m.p.h. at the 1600 South railroad

At the time of the collision alleged herein, the

Denver & Rio Grande train was traveling at forty nine (49)
r .p.h.

90.

A tram

traveling at 49-50 m.p.h. will cover said

137' in about 1.87 seconds.
91.

It

takes

an

(See paragraph 88 above.)

average

driver

a

minimum

of

7.2

seconds to travel from a full stop at the stop sign across
the tracks to & point of safety.
92.
it

According to the foregoing

j L; n.athrat i r al ] *

T.^ossibie
1(»

for

speeds and distances,
any

driver

to

safely

OJ-JV-1

Chapter 30. Governmental Immunity
Act

43<3i-3t. laoVaaatflcatloa of

43-30-1. Short title.

This act shall be known and may be died
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act."

43-34-1. Short tttk.
43-34-1. DcfaaMoaa.
4 3 4 1 ^ Iauao**y of
43-34-4. Act ac oraaoi
aeatt«4*a*fltt*-tll%c\*t

a3-30-2. Deflaltioaa,

6 3 4 * 4 . Wahor of
43-34*4. Wartor of
for lajary fn
for lajary e*""*** * f
coaattttoa of Ugawayt,
for lajary fro" <
;, strectare, or other aabac
for lajary coosaa* ay
of esaatoyot - Excoatloas •
ay vtolaCloB of foartk
Notice - Coaieats - Service •tote or Hi caaatoyot - flaw for
•oMrfWooorHs
iaiplnyw « Tlsae for fllaag aotice.
43-34-14. d a t e for lajary - Appro
IwtmmtmtMi eatlty or tasaraacecarrier witala atacty

43-34-U

43-34-15. Deals* of data for lajary - Aataortty aad Use
for fttag actioa afalaft govenuaeatal eatlty.
43-34-14. Jartoatenoa of afetrkt coaru orer actios* Appacatioa of Raks of ChU Procadarc.
43*34-17. Veaae of actioas.
43-34-1S. Coatproaaise aad settleaaeat of actioas.
43-30-1*. Uodertattag repaired of oUJatiff la actioa.
43-34-24. Jodgaaeot agatost go*/eraateataf eatlty ban
aetiea agaftast camaloyae.
43-30-21. Erprakd
43-34-22. Eicmplary or aaafttvt 4asaagcs prohibited Goteraofceatai eatlty exempt froai exeeatfoa, attacbajeat
43-30-23. Fayaarat of etatai or Jedgaaeat agaiast state Preteatattat for payajeat.
43-30-24. Payaaest of dalai or Jedgiaeot agaJast political
sabdhisioa - Ptocoaare by torcraiag body.
43-34-25. Payawat of data or Jedgaaeat afalast political
fabdMdoe • lostafljaeat aayaaeat*.
43-34-24. Resent foods for eayaatat of dates or
parceaat of lasaraace created by political sabdhrWoas.
43-30-27. Tax levy by pobticaJ sebdMsloef for payawat
of dsiats, Jedgioeats or laoaraact aresaiase*.
43-34-21. Uabfllty (asaraacc - Parcaase or sdMataraace
ay goteraiaeetal eatlty aotaorised - EmhHiaaafot of
trast accoaats for self4aaaraace.
43-34-2f. feaeaJed.
43-3o-2f J . liability fauoraec* - CoostractloB of poacy
aot hi comptmac* wit* act.
43-34-30. Repealed.
43-30-31. Liability iesaraect • Coestroctloa of policy oot
la comottaac* wUk a d .
43-30-32. liability tasvaoce - Metaods for parcaase or
43-30-33. UabOfryftesaraace- Utaaraace for eiaployees
eetaertzed • No rtgat to ladeaialflcatloa or coatrlbatloa
froai goTerasacatal ageacy.
43-30-34. LiaritatJoa of Jadgoaeats agaiast govenuaeatal
eatity or employee - latarmoct coverage exceptioa
43-30-35 Compreaeaslrt Mab4aty plaa • Provldlag
coverage • Expeates of attoraey geaeral la repreeeatiag
stale or esaployoes.
43-30-34. Defeodtag gOTcnuaeat eatployee - Rosjaest •
CooperaHoa - Paysaeat of Jedgaaeat.
43-30-37 Recovery of Jadgaaeat paid aad defease coats by
goveraaaeat eatployee.

k»vtt&\b^4ba9*«'.
(1) "State" means the state of Utah, and i
any office, department, agency, auth
commission, board, institution, hospital,
university or other instrumentality of the state;
(2) 'Political subdivision* means any
city, town, school district, public transit
redevelopment agency, special imp
taxing district, or other governmental sub
or public corporation;
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state]
its political subdivisions as defined herein;
(4) "Employee" means any officer, emp
servant of a governmental entity, whether
compensated, including student teacf
certificated in accordance with section 53-2
educational aides, students engaged in prov
services to members of the pubbc in the
an approved medical, nursing, or
professional health care clinical training pro
volunteers and tutors;
(5) "Claim" means any claim or cause of i
for money or damages against a gove
entity or against an employee;
(6) "Injury" means death, injury to a
damage to or loss of property, or any other :
thai a 9exsaa> may, suffer to ok Qexs/ttu o*
that would be actionable if inflicted by a
person or his agent.
(7) "Personal injury" means an injury of i
kind other than property damage;
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in
personal property.
63-30-3. I n s a n i t y of governmental entities frosa"
salt.

Except as may be otherwise provided
chapter, all governmental entities are is
from suit for any injury which results fronT
exercise of a governmental functic
governxnentally-owned hospital, nursing home,
other governmental health care facility, and ffl
an approved medical, nursing, or
professional health care clinical training pro
conducted in either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and
construction, repair, and operation of flood
storm systems by governmental entities
considered to be governmental functions,
governmental entities and their officers
employees are immune from suit for any injury <
damage resulting from those activities.
63-30-4. Act provisions not coastraed as adniissfosv
or denial of liability - Effect of waiver of
unmaalry - Exclusive remedy • Joinder of
employee • Limitations oa personal Uabfllty.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter,
specifically provided, shall be construed as M
admission or denial of liability or responsibility •
so far as governmental entities or their employes
are concerned. If immunity from suit is waived tyj
this chapter, consent to be sued is granted
liability of the enuty shall be determined as if 4jj
entity were a private person.

EXHIBIT "H"

63-30-11
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as
adversely affecting any immunity from suit which
a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or
its employee for an injury caused by an act or*
omission which occurs during the performance of
such employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority it, after
the effective date of this act, exclusive -of any
other civil action or proceeding by reason of the
same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim, unless the employee acted or
failed to act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action
against a governmental entity in a representative
capacity if the act or omission complained of is
one for which the governmental entity may be
liable, but no employee may be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that the employee acted or
failed to act due to fraud or malice.
no
63-30-5. Waiver of humanity as to contractual
obligations.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived as to any contractual obligation and
actions arising out of contractual rights or
obligations shall not be subject to the requiremenu
of sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13 or 6330-19.
tsas
63-30-6. Waiver of humanity as to actions
involving property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for the recovery of any property real or
personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet
title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other
hens thereon or to determine any adverse claim
thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any
mortgage or other lien said entity may have or
claim on the property involved.
ltss
63-30-7. Waiver of humanity for Injury from
negligent operation of motor vehicles • Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury resulting from the negligent
operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or
other equipment during the performance of his
duties, within the scope of employment, or tinder
color, of authority; provided, however, that this
section shall not apply to the operation of
emergency vehicles as defined by law and while
being driven in accordance with the requirements
of section 41-6-14.
1*3
63-30-ft. Waiver of Imnmaity for injury canted by
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of
highways, bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury caused by a defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition of any highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel,
bndge, viaduct or other structure located thereon.
IMS

63-30-9. Waiver of Immunity for Injury from
diagerons or defective public building, structure,
or other nubile Improvement - Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous
or defective condition of any public building.

structure, dam, reservoir or other .public
improvement. Immunity is not waived for patent
effective conditions.
uei
6M0-10. Waiver of immunity for mjury earned
by negligent act or amlasinn of t maloyn «
Exceptions- Wavier for injury canted by vUmdoa
•f fourth amendment rights.
(l)lmmunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately caused by
a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of bis employment
except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused,
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, ma&dous proaecntion,
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel,
slander, deceit, interference with contract rights,
infliction of mental anguish, or civilrights,or
(c) arises out of the Issuance, denial,
suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or
similar authorization, or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an
inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate
or negligent inspection of any property, or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even
if malicious or without probable cause, or
(0 irises out of a misrepresentation by said
employee whether or not such is negligent or
intentional, or
(g) arises out of or results, from riot, unlawful
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence
and civil disturbances, or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the
collection of and assessment of taxes, or
(i) arises out of the activities of the. Utah
National Guard, or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county or city jail or
other place of legal confinement, or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state
lands or the result of any activity authorized by
the state land board.
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately caused or
arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16 of
Title 78 which shall be the exclusive remedy for
injuries to those protected rights. If section 78-165 or subsection 77-35- 12(g) or any parts thereof
are held invalid or unconstitutional, this
subsection (2) shall be void and governmental
entities shall remain immune from suit for
violations of fourth amendment rights.
urn
63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents Service - Legal disability.
(1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute
of limiutions that would apply if the claim were
against a private person commences to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against
a governmental entity or against an employee for
an act of omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority shall,
before maintaining an action, file a written notice
of claim with such entity.

63-30-12
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth a brief
statement of facts, the nature of the claim
asserted, and the damages incurred by the
claimant so far as they are known, shall be signed
by the person making the claim or such person's
agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, and shall
be directed and delivered to the responsible
governmental entity in the manner and within the
time prescribed in section. 63-30-12 or 63-30-13,
as applicable.
(4) If, at the time the claim arises, the claimant is
under the age of majority, or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian, or
imprisoned, upon application by the claimant and
after hearing and notice to the governmental entity
the court, in its discretion, may extend the time
for service of notice of claim; but in no event shall
it grant an extension which exceeds the applicable
statute of limitations. In determining whether to
grant an extension, the court shall consider
whether the delay in serving the notice of claim
will substantially prejudice the governmental entity
in maintaining its defense on the merits.
was
63-30-12. Claim against state or Its employee Time for filing notice.
A claim against the state or its employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the attorney general and the
agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of
time granted under subsection 63-30-1K4).
i§t3
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or Its
employee - Time for Wing notke.
A claim against a political subdivision or against
its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of employment,' or under color of authority,
is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
governing body of the political subdivision within
one year after the claim arises, or before the
expiration of any extension of time granted under
subsection 63-30-11(4).
IMJ
63-30-14. Claim for iajary - Approval or denial by
governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall
act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of
its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to
have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day
period the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.
ms
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury - Authority
and time for filing action against governmental
entity.
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute
an action in the district court against the
governmental entity in those circumstances in
which immunity from suit has been waived in this
chapter. The action must be commenced within
one year after denial or the denial period as
specified in this chapter.
\w
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over
actions - Application of Roles of Qvfi Procedure.
The district courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over any action brought under this
chapter and such actions shall be governed by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are

consistent with this chapter.

.mi

63-30-17. Venue of action*.
Actions against the state may be brought in the
county in which the claim arose ortin Salt Lake
County. Actions against a county may be brought
in the county in which the claim arose, or in the
defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a
district court judge of the defendant county, in
any county contiguous to the defendant county.
Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions against all
other political subdivisions including cities and
towns, shall be brought in the county in which the
political subdivision is located or in the county in
which the claim arose.
no
63-30-11. Compromise and settJeaatnt of actions.
A political subdivision, after conferring with its
legal officer or other legal counsel if it has no such,
officer, may compromise and settle any action as
to the damages or other relief sought.
%
The risk manager in the department of
administrative services may compromise and settle
any claim for damages filed against the state up to
and including $10,000 for which the risk
management fund may be liable, and may, with
the concurrence of the attorney general or his
representative and the executive director of the
department of administrative services, compromise
and settle a claim for damages in excess of $10,000
for which the risk management fund may be
liable.
ml
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff fas
action.
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court,
but in no case less than the sum of $300,
conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of
taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the
action or fails to recover judgment.
utf
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental entity
bars action against employee.
Judgment against a governmental entity in a i
action brought under this act shall constitute i
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by
reason of the same subject matter, against the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim.
tttl
63-30-21. Repealed.

lm

63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages
prohibited - Governmental entity exempt from
execution, attachment or garnishment.
No judgment shall be rendered against' the
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive
damages; nor shall execution, attachment or
garnishment issue against the governmental entity.
ms
63-30-23. Payment of daim or Judgment against
state - Presentment for payment.
Any claim approved by the state as defined by
subsection 63-30-2(5) or any final judgment
obtained against the state shall be presented to the
state risk manager, or to the office, agency,
institution or other instrumentality involved for
payment, if payment by said instrumentality is
otherwise permitted by law. If such payment is not
authorized by law then said judgment or claim
shall be presented to the board of examiners and
the board shall proceed as provided in section 636-10.
is*

63-30-32
43-30-24. Paysaeat of daim or judgment against
political sabdlvtoloa • Procedure by govseaiag
body.
Any daim approved by a political subdivision or
any final judgment obtained against a political
subdivision shall be submitted to the governing
body thereof to be paid forthwith from the general
funds o f said political subdivision unless said
funds are appropriated to some other use or
restricted by law or contract for other purposes,
ms
63-30-25. Payment of daim or jadgmeat agaiast
political subdrrisioe • laftaDmeat payments.
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or
award during the current fiscal year it may pay the
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing
annual installments of equal size or In such other
installments as are agreeable to the claimant.
tm
63-30-26. Reserve faads for paymeat of claims or
purchase of iasarmact created by aoHtkal
sabdhrlsioas.
Any political subdivision may create and
maintain a reserve fund or may jointly with one or
more other political subdivisions make
contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the
purpose of making payment of claims against the
co-operating subdivisions when they become
payable pursuant to this chapter, or for the
purpose of purchasing liability insurance to
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or
allriskscreated by this chapter.
ms
63-30-27. Tax levy by political sabdhrlsioas for
paymeat of daim*, Jadgmeats or lasaraace
premiums.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, all political subdivisions shall have
authority to levy an annual property tax sufficient
to pay any claims, settlements or judgements, or
to pay the costs to defend against same, or for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining a reserve
fund for the payment of such claims, settlements
or judgments as may be reasonably anticipated;
and there is hereby specifically included any
judgment against an elected official or employee
of any political subdivision, including peace
officers based upon a claim for punitive damages,
provided, that the authority of a political
subdivision for the payment of such judgments for
punitive damages is bmited in any individual case
to $10,000. It is hereby declared to be the
legislative intent that the payments authorized for
punitive judgments is money spent for a public
purpose within the meaning of this section and
Article XIII, section 5 of the Constitution of
Utah; or to pay the premium for such insurance as
authorized, even though as a result of such levy
the maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is
exceeded; provided, that in no event shall such
levy exceed one-half mill nor shall the revenues
derived therefrom be used for any other purpose
than those stipulated herein.
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63-30-24. Liability iasurmoce - Purchase or sdfittsuraace by govennneutal entity authorized Establishment of trust accounts for setf-iasuraace.
Any governmental entity within the state may
purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or
self-insure and purchase excess commercial
insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this
chapter against any risk created or recognized by
this chapter or any action for which a
governmental entity or its employee may be held

Sable.
In addition to any other reasonable means of
self-insurance, a governmental entity may sdfinsurt with respect to specified classes of claims by
establishing a trust account under the management
of an independent private trustee having authority
with respect to claims of that character to expend
both principal and earnings of the trust account
solely to pay the costs of investigation, discovery,
and other pretrial and litigation expenses including
attorneys' fees, and to pay all sums for which the
governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for
which a compromise settlement may be agreed
anon. The monies and Interest earned on said trust
fund shall be subject to Investment pursuant to the
State Money 'Management Act 51-7-1 to 51-7-2
and shall be subject to audit by the state auditor.
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust
agreement between the governmental entity and
the trustee may authorize the trustee to employ
counsel to defend actions against the entity and its
employees and to protect and safeguard the assets
of the trust, to provide for claims investigation
and adjustment services, to employ expert
witnesses and consultants, and to provide such
other services and functions necessary and proper
to cany out the purposes of the trust.
ism
63-30-29. Repealed.

tm

63-30-29.5. Uabmty lasaraace - Goverasaeat
vehicles operated by employees oatsMe scope of
emptoymeat.
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven
by employees of the governmental entity with the
express or implied consent of the entity, but
which, at the time liability is incurred as a result of
an automobile accident, is not being driven and
used within the course and scope of the driver's
employment is deemed to provide the driver with
the insurance coverage required by Chapter 41,
Title 31, and is deemed to provide liability
coverage by the governmental entity in accordance
with the requirements of the Safety Responsibility
Act (section 41-12-1 et. seq.). In no event,
however, shall the limits of, the liability coverage
provided Under this subsection be deemed to
exceed the minimum bodily injury and property
limits specified in section 41-12-5.
was
63-30-30. Repealed.

tro

63-30-31. liability lasaraace - CoastructJoa of
policy not la compttaace with act.
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement
hereafter issued and purchased to insure against
any risk which may arise as a result of the
application of this chapter, which contains any
condition or provision not in compliance with the
requirements of the chapter, shall not be rendered
invalid thereby, but shall be construed and applied
in accordance with such conditions and provisions
as would have applied had such policy, rider or
endorsement been in full compliance with this
chapter, provided the policy is otherwise valid.
ism
63-30-32. liability lasaraace • Methods for
purchase or reaewal.
No contract or policy of insurance may be
purchased or renewed under this chapter except
upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best
bidders; except that the purchase or renewal of
insurance by the state shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of sections 63-56-1
through 63-56-73.
isaj

63-30-33
63-30-33. UaMftty intmact - latmuK* for
eaiployeea aathortzed • No right to
Isuif •IfVirtoa or cosrtribtrtion from
govtrnsaeatal agency.
A governmental entity may insure any or all of
its employees against liability, in whole or in part,
for injury or damages resulting from an act or
omission occurring during the performance of an
employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority,
regardless of whether or not said entity is immune
from suit for said act' or omission, and any
expenditure for such insurance is for a public
purpose. The insurer under any contract or policy
of insurance pursuant to this section shall have no
right to indemnification or contribution from the
governmental entity or hi employee with respect to
any loss or liability covered by the contract or'
policy.
ms
43-90-34. Us&katkMi of Jadgsaenls agalast
governsaesrtal entity or eaaployee - lasarance
coverage exception.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if
a judgment for personal injury against a
governmental entity, or an employee whom a
governmental entity has a duty to indemnify,
exceeds $250,000 for one person in any one
occurrence, or 1500,000 for two or more persons
in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the
judgment to that amount.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), if
a judgment for property damage against a
governmental entity, or an employee whom a
governmental entity has a duty to indemnify,
exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount.
(3) If a governmental entity has secured
insurance coverage in excess of the amounts set
forth in subsections (1) and (2), the court shall
reduce the amount of the judgment or award to a
sum equal to the applicable limits of the insurance
coverage.
ist3
43-30-35. Comprehensive liability plan - Providing
coverage - Expenses of attorney general in
representing state or employees.
(1) After consultation with appropriate state
agencies, the risk manager in the department of
administrative services shall provide a
comprehensive liability plan, with limits not lower
than those set forth in section 63-30-34, which
will protect the state and its indemnified
employees from claims and liability. Deductibles
and maximum limits of coverage shall be
determined by the risk manager in consultation
with the director of administrative services.
(2) The risk manager may expend funds from the
risk management fund established in section 63-147, to procure and provide coverage to all state
agencies and their indemnified employees, except
those specifically exempted by law, and shall
apportion the cost of such coverage in accordance
with section 63-1-47. Unless specifically
authorized by statute to do so, including
subsection 63-1-47(9), no agency other than the
risk manager may procure or provide liability
insurance for the state.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 675-3 or any other provision of this code, the state
attorney general may bill the department of
administrative services for all costs and legal fees
expended by the attorney general, including

attorneys' and secretarial salaries, in representing*
the state or any indemnified employee against any'
claim for which the risk management fund may be^
liable and in advising state agencies and employees^
regarding such claims. The risk manager shall \
draw funds from the risk management fund for*
this purpose.
WJ
63-30-36. Defending government esnntoyee •
Reqnest - Cooperation * Payment of jadgsneai.
(1) Before a governmental entity may defend itaj
employee against a claim, the employee must make,
a written request to the governmental entity toJ
defend him and must make it within ten days after"
service of process upon him or within such longer:
period as would not prejudice the governmental*
entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf, orj
conflict with notice requirements imposed on the]
entity in connection with insurance carried by the'
entity relating to the risk involved. If the employee]
fails to make a request or fails to reasonably^
cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity?
is not required to defend or continue to defend ther
employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or,
settlement against the employee in respect to the
claim.
«
(2) If a governmental entity conducts the defense;
of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay^
any judgment based upon or any compromise or,
settlement of the claim except as provided in!
subsection (3).
»~J
(3) A governmental entity may conduct the)
defense of an employee under an agreement withi
the employee that the government entity reserves
the right not to pay the judgment, compromise, ofj
settlement unless it is established that the daiml
arose out of an act or omission occurring during:
the performance of his duties, within the scope o f
his employment, or under color of authority.
tm]
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense J
costs by government employee.
I
(1) Subject to subsection (2), if an employee pays1
a judgment entered against him, or any portion of
it, which the governmental entity is required to<
pay under section 63-30-36, the employee it
entitled to recover the amount of such payment
and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense
from the governmental entity.
^
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the:
defense of an employee against 8 claim, or does
conduct the defense under an agreement a£
provided in subsection 63-30-36(3), the employee
may recover from the governmental entity under
subsection (1) if:
^
(a) The employee establishes that ihe act or
omission upon which the judgment is based
occurred during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of his employment, or under
color of authority, and that he conducted the
defense in good faith; and
(b) The governmental entity does not establish
that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud
or malice of the employee.
tfts
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity
by employee not required.
If a governmental entity pays all or pan of a
judgment based on or a compromise or settlement
of a claim against the governmental entity or an
employee, the employee may not be required to
indemnify the governmental entity for the
payment.
isaj

I9W JUL 26 Pll * 5 5
tVlLLJAMF.hUI5li.afKh

Q^DEKTV
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AFFIDAVIT OF EDNA ARGYLE
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a corporation,
GERALD H. BURTON, an
individual, CITY OF
SPRINGVILLE, a municipal
corporation, and STATE OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Civil No. 62912

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH )
)
COUNTY OF UTAH)

ss:

I, Edna Argyle, being first duly sworn, do say:
1.

I was a member of the jury in the above-entitled case.

2.

To the best of my recollection, during the questioning
of prospective jurors, when counsel mentioned the
witnesses to be called. Dr. John Mendenhall was not
named as a prospective witness.

EXHIBIT " I "

*;yj

3.

I have had medical services provided to me by Dr.
Mendenhall, including the implantation of artificial
knees.

4.

The first time that I knew that Dr. Mendenhall was to
be a witness for Plaintiff was when Dr. Mendenhall was
called to the stand.

5.

I recognized the Doctor, but I did not inform the
Court or the attorneys that I knew the Doctor and had
been treated by him.

6.

I did inform members of the jury of my medical
experience with Dr. Mendenhall prior to the verdict
being returned.

r~

Edna Argyl

Subscribed and sworn to before me this o?I^ ^ day of ^ h/jjj
1984.
,y
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Notary
.._jary Publi<
Public
Residing at : Q ^ z / t ^ y ^ i ^ 7 t
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DATE AND TIME THIS REPORT
16APR82

L

-

82-379

TYPE OF REPORT

T/C

0630hrs.

16APR82 0630hrs. I was dipatched to a "possible train vehicle" collision, location
unk. at the "south end of town"
700 South

and "around 700 South."

I checked the area of

and 800 South Main St. and was then directed to the railroad yard on

400 Vest. As I checked that location, the actual location was relayed to me as
1600 South Main St..

Upon arrival I confirmed need for an ambulance with dispatch

and attended to the driver (injured party). Driver was conscious and seemed
rational inspite of his injuries.

I obtained information as to identity of driver

and then asked him what had happened.
information:

Driver, Robert Gleave, gave me the following

Driver was E/B on 1600 South. He stated that he "slowed down" at

the stop sign and looked to the south. He did not see any train. He then turned
to look north. When he did he saw the train "right on top of" him. He said
that he tried evasive action (stopping and backing) but was unable to avoid
collision. Driver did not know how he was ejected from the vehicle. Ambulance
personnel then arrived and attended to Driver.
I then contacted the conductor, C.E. Connors, who gave the following information
to me: The train (owned and operated by Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad)
was on an eastbound route (south bound at the point of impact) at approx. 50
(fifty) miles per hour. As they approached the intersection of 1600 South, they
observed the vehicle (V-l) pull out too far into the intersection before stopping,
and into the path of their train.

The train was a 33 (thirty three) car diesel

which was running emptv at the time.
The following measurements were taken at the scene: Width of total roadway
at intersection with RR tracks—21'5" .

Distance from south edge of roadway to

approx. P0I--7 ?c ) n . Distance ^01 to POR--29'0". Distance veh to tracks approx.3 ! .
Driver was located between the veh. and the tracks.

SPRINCyiLLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
NARRATIVE

REPORT
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DATE AND TIME THIS REPORT

16APR82

82-379

TYPE OF REPORT

T/C

0630hrs.

Driver was transported by ambulance to Mountain View Hospital, with multiple
injuries to torso, head, leg (area of left knee) and left foot.

Vehicle, a 1975 Chev Monza appeared to be totaled, all windshields and side
windows appeared in tact with the exception of the drivers side window which was
down (probable point of ejection.)

Unknown at time of report whether the train engineer had activated his
horn as audible signal as he was approaching the intersection.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.-FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
CHARLES HARSIN,
ORDER STATING UNCONTESTED AND
CONTESTED FACTS AND GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,

Civil No. C-83-0993W

Defendant.

I.
INTRODUCTION
This is an action by plaintiff against defendant for
injuries sustained by plaintiff when he collided with
defenant's stationary train at a railroad crossing at Ogden,
Utah.

Defendant The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad

Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary
Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
David K. Winder, Monday, January 7, 1985 at 10:00 a.m.
Plaintiff Charles A. Harsin was represented by Richard W.
Campbell.

Defendant was represented by Alan L. Sullivan and

Patrick J. O'Hara.

Since the Court is not going to grant

judgment on the whole case, this Order is entered pursuant to
Rule 56(d), F.R.C.P.

EHXIBIT "K"

II.
UNCONTESTED FACTS
Having reviewed the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, together with the uncontested facts stated in
the Pretrial Order and Affidavits and Memorandum filed by
defendant in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and
Partial Summary Judgment, the Court finds that there is no
genuine issue as to the following material facts:
1.

At or about 3:55 a.m. on June 28, 1979, plaintiff

Charles Harsin was driving east along 21st Street at Ogden,
Utah on a 1973 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, Sprint Model.
2.

At the time of the accident, it was dark, the

weather was clear, and the -jrface of the road was level.
3.

The Rio Grande's track crosses 21st Street at a

point approximately one block west of Wall Street at Ogden.
4.

On the morning of the accident a standard black

and white railroad "crossbuck" sign was located about 36 feet
west of the west rail of the track; a white line was painted
across all three lanes of 21st Street at a distance of about 36
feet west of the west rail; one standard round yellow and black
railroad crossing advance warning sign was located about 200
feet west of the crossing and another standard round yellow and
black railroad crossing advance warning sign was located about
611 feet west of the crossing.
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Three large white "railroad

crossing" pavement markings were located about 181 feet west of
the crossing and two more large white "railroad crossing"
pavement markings were located about 611 feet west of the
crossing.
5.

Plaintiff definitely knew that he was approaching

the railroad crossing on the morning of the accident because he
had gone across the crossing at least once a day for
approximately three years before June 1979.
6.

Plaintiff collided with the side of the Rio

Grande's stationary engine at the 21st Street crossing.
7.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint against the Rio

Grande on or about June 24, 1983.
III.
CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT
The following material facts are in good faith
controverted by the parties and shall be reserved for trial:
1.

At the time of the accident, what Rio Grande

lights were operating?
2.

At the time of the accident, was the train bell

3.

At the time of the accident, was plaintiff

ringing?

travelling too fast under the circumstances to stop in time to
prevent the collision?

-3-

IV.
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Having fully considered the foregoing uncontested
facts and the applicable law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Partial Summary Judgment is entered in favor of

defendant and against plaintiff that, to the extent that
plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant was negligent in
not installing additional or different signs, lights, or other
traffic control devices at the 21st Street railroad crossing,
said allegations are dismissed with prejudice as a matter of
law because the authority for installing signs, lights, or
other traffic control devices at railroad crossings within Utah
is exclusively vested in agencies of the State of Utah.

Utah

Code Ann. § 54-4-15, 54-4-15.1, 54-4-15.3 (1953, as amended).
As a matter of law, therefore, defendant had no duty to install
additional or different traffic warning devices at the 21st
Street railroad crossing.
2.

Partial Summary Judgment is entered in favor of

defendant and against plaintiff that the 21st Street railroad
crossing is not an extrahazardous crossing.
3.

Partial Summary Judgment is entered in favor of

defendant and against plaintiff with respect to any allegations
in plaintiff's Complaint that defendant is liable to plaintiff
for negligently causing damage to plaintiff's personal

-4-

property.

As a matter of law, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(2)

(1953, as amended) requires that an action for negligent damage
to personal property be brought within three years after the
cause of action arises.

Since plaintiff's Complaint was filed

more than three years after the accident described in
plaintiff's Complaint, plaintiff is barred from making any
claim at trial for damage to his personal property.
The Court is of the opinion that it is not appropriate
to enter complete summary judgment on the whole case because
there are contested issues of fact regarding the extent of
plaintiff's negligence and as to what Rio Grande lights were
burning and whether the train bell was ringing.
ENTERED this

' ,, " day of January, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
David K. Winder
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INSTRUCTION NO,

z<

The evidence in this case has shown that Mr. Gleave was
not wearing his seat belt at the time of the collision,
although his vehicle was equipped with seat belts.

If you find

from a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Gleave*s damages
would have been less severe if he had been wearing a seat belt
at the time of the accident, then you are instructed to reduce
the amount of damages, if any, that you award to Mr. Gleave in
an amount equal to the extent that Mr. Gleave!s damages would
have been avoided had Mr. Gleave worn his seat belt.

EXHIBIT "L"

7M:>

INSTRUCTION NO. 2*7

One of the interrogatories that the jury will have to
answer in the Special Verdict is whether the Utah Department of
Transportation was negligent, and if so, whether that
negligence was the proximate cause of Mr. Gleave's injuries.
If the jury does attribute negligence to the Department of
Transportation, a related interrogatory that the jury will have
to answer is to what extent (expressed as a percentage) did the
Department of Transportation's negligence contribute to Mr.
Gleave's injuries.

It is necessary for the jury to answer the

interrogatories about the percentage of negligence, if any,
attributable to the Utah Department of Transportation because
the jury may not hold the Rio Grande, Utah Railway or the City
of Springville responsible for the Department of
Transporation's errors and omissions, if any, regarding the
geometic design of the 1600 South crossing and/or the adequacy
of the traffic safety devices at the 1600 South crossing.

i
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Mr. Willis J. Woodard, #16623
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Re:

Your deposition in Gleave v. The Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, et al. Civil No.
62912.

Dear Willis:
With regard to the above-referenced matter, I have
received from Cameron Hansen two similar but different
handwritten notes which contain proposed ffchangesff to your
sworn deposition testimony.
Your notes are troublesome because they appear to
suggest that your testimony may depend upon whether the
Railroad will rehire you after you are released from prison.
Neither you nor the Railroad can permit such an inference.
Your testimony must be the truth -- nothing more, nothing less.
The possibility of your return to the Railroad will in
no way be affected by your testimony in this case -- so long as
you tell the truth. The Railroad cannot promise you employment
if you testify in a manner favorable to the Railroad and it
will not refuse you employment just because your testimony
might be unfavorable.
At your deposition you were sworn to tell the truth
the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Because of this,
the testimony you gave at that time was given under penalty of

EHXIBIT "N"
nr\rm

; B A G LEY, C O R N W A L L 6. MCCARTHY
H r . Willis J, Woodard
March 3f 1984
Page 2

perjury. The ffchangesH which you indicate that you will send
to opposing counsel only if you do not hear from Mr. Hansen,
both differ Jtrom what you testified to earlier, and, in some
instances, do not even relate to the same material addressed by
the question and your original answer. Moreover, the "changes"
you suggest in your second note differ from the same "changes"
in your first note. I simply cannot accept these as legitimate
changes to your deposition when they are transmitted under
conditions that suggest they are only to be made if the
Railroad doesn't guarantee you employment when you get out of
prison.
If your original testimony was true and complete as
given, you change it only by committing perjury. On the other
hand, if your original testimony was not true or complete, you
must change it to make it so, regardless of the consequences.
Please let either me or Cameron Hansen know what you
desire to do with respect to this testimony. It is my
understanding that you already have a copy of your deposition.
If not, let me know and I can get you another copy. Also, I am
providing proper forms for changing your deposition, should you
decide to make any changes.
Very truly yours,

" ^ ^ ^

7-^

E. Scott Savage/^
ESS/mje
Enclosures

# / 6
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Instruction No.

' ^

Under Utah law the ultimate determination regarding
right of way and crossing design and crossing warning and
safety devices is placed under the control of the Utah
Department of Transportation.

You may not therefore find

either defendant railroad negligent based upon any defects
which might exist with respect to the design of the 1600
South crossing or based upon any problems you may perceive
in the lack of traffic warning devices at the 1600 South
crossing.
However, irrespective of the foregoing, the defendant
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad is not relieved of
any responsibility to exercise due care when its trains
approach such crossing.

Consequently, if you find that the

configuration of the land and other physical features in
the area make sucn crossing more than ordinarily hazardous
and that the warning devices employed at the crossing were
inadequate to warn the public of the danger, you shall
determine wnether the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad knew of or ^hould have known of such condition
and whether it exercised due care in view of all the
circumstances.

The failure to exercise due care under

such conditions would constitute negligence.

EXHIBIT "0"

Instruction (Jo. '/
The claims of the parties are as follows:
FLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
(a)

That the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western

Railroad

failed to give a sufficient and

reasonable

audible warning that the train was approaching the 1600
South Crossing.
(b)

That the defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western

Railroad failed to

use

reasonable caution in approaching

the 1600 South crossing taking into consideration
the physical features affecting visability at such
crossing.
(c)

That defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western

Railroad and defendant Utah Railway failed to remove
plants and shrubs from the railroad

right-of-way

which obstructed the plaintiff's view of any train
approaching the 1600 South crossing.
DEFENDANTS DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD AND UTAH RAILWAY CLAIM
The defendants Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
and Utah Railway deny the claims of plaintiff and allege that
plaintiff was himself negligent in failing to maintain
a proper lookout and in failing to yield the right-of-way
to the tra i n .

EXHIBIT "P"

Instruction No.

^'

(cont'd)

The foregoing is merely a general statement of what
the indicated parties claim against each other and is
not intended to indicate what facts may or may not have
been established by the evidence.

7;>n

)
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Jeffrey E. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant
Suite 1600, 50 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

PAUL L. bADCER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
LeANN D. BELLON, LAIRD BELLON,
ANGELEE BELLONf by her Guardian
Ad Litem Laird Bellon, and JESS
LAIRD BELLON, Deceased, by the
Personal Representative of his
estate. Laird Bellon,
Plaintiffs,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

- vs -

Civil No. C83-0888A
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant.

:
:
:

The defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came
on for hearing before the Court at 9:30 A.M. on August 30, 1984.
The defendant was represented by E. Scott Savage and Jeffrey E.
Nelson, and the plaintiffs were represented by Ray M. Harding and
Greg W. Stephens.

The Court considered the memoranda and evidence

proffered by the parties and heard oral argument.
The Court, being fully advised, finds that the Utah State
Legislature has vested state agencies with the exclusive authority

EXHIBIT "Q"

to determine and prescribe the type of warning signs, lights, and
other traffic control devices for public railroad crossings within
the State of Utah.

For this reason, the Court is of the opinion

that the Railroad cannot be found negligent for failing to install
control devices different from those which existed at the subject
crossing on the day of the accident.

The Court, however, cannot

determine at this time that the plaintiff, LeAnn D. Bellon, was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment is granted with respect to the plaintiffs' claim of negligence in regard to the implementation of
crossing protection; and the defendant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the issue of plaintiff LeAnn D. Bellon1s contributory
negligence is denied at this time.
DATED this

j)

^4^$Y.

day of

1984.

BY THE COURT:

ALDOTJ Ajr ANDERSOt^
F e d e r a l Disrt^cict Court Judge
APPROVED_AS TO FORM:

Copies mailed 9/10/84:dp
Ray M. Harding, Esq.
Jeffrey E. Nelson, E9q.
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, VAN COTT, BACLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
I E. Scott Savage
II
Paul M. Durham
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 1600, 50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8A1A4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD CO>TANY, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs .
Civil No. C-82-03^4J

WEST JORDAN IftJNICIPAL
CORPORATION', et al. ,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff, The Denver L Rio Grande Western Railroad

Cor.panv, is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the
State of Delaware and having its principal place of business in
the State of Colorado.
2.

Defendant, V.esz Jordan Municipal Corporation, is a

municipal corporation organized under the laws of

the State of

Utah with its principal place of business in the State of Utah.
3.

Defendant, Dennis K. Randall, is a citizen of the

State of Utah and mayor of the City of West Jordan.
U.

Defendant, Allan G

Tolman, is a citizen of the

State of Utah, and manager of the City of West Jordan.
5.

Defendants, Si.err Monson, Chris But tars, Betty Naylor,

and Howard Larben, are citizens of the State of Utah and members

EXHIBIT "R"

of the West Jordan City Council.
6.

The matter in controversy herein exceeds, exclusive

of interest and costs, the sum of $10,000.
7.

Plaintiff is engaged in business as a common carrier

by rail in interstate commerce.
8.

During the month of February or March, 1982,

defendants caused to be enacted an ordinance designated as
sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102 of the West Jordan Municipal Code
(hereinafter the "ordinance") which provided as follows
6-7-101 WARNING AND SIGNAL DEVICES REQUIRED AT
RAILROAD GRADE CROSSINGS
At every location where the railroad track
crosses a street, highway or other roadway
utilized by vehicular traffic, the company or
corporation operating such railroad shall install
the appropriate signal or warning devices and
lights, of a type specified by the Utah Department of Transportation.
6-7-102

FLAG OR GATES REQUIRED

(a) At every location where a railroad track
crosses a street, highway or other roadway and
where there are not signal or warning devices as
required by Section 6-7-101, above, the railroad
company or corporation operating the said train
shall provide two flagmen, one on each side of
the grade crossing, to warn oncoming vehicular
traffic of the approaching train. Said flagmen
shall position themselves on each side of the
grade crossing at the approach of the train where
such train is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard to vehicular traffic and shall
remain so positioned until the train has cleared
the grade crossing. Each flagman shall be
equipped with a flag at least 16" square. In
tines of darkness, the flagman shall be equipped
with a red lantern capable of being visible under
normal atmospheric condition for a distance of
500'. In the alternative, the railroad company
or corporation may elect to install gates which
will be lowered upon approach of the train and
which will remain lowered while the train is
within the grade crossing. Said gates shall
extend completely across the traffic lanes of
that portion of the roadway and shall be constructed to also impede the passage of pedestrians and other nonvehicular traffic across the
grade crossing. The gates shall be of a type and
size to be readily visible in the lowered position at a distance of 500' under normal atmospheric conditions. At night, the gates shall
contain on each side at least two red warning
lights visible at a distance of 500*.
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(b) The requirements of subsection (a), above,
shall be in addition to any other legal requirements concerning the sounding of a whistle or
bell upon approach to such grade crossing.
(c) The engineer operating such train and the
conpany or corporation operating such railroad
shall both be guilty of a class B misdemeanor if
the train crosses said grade crossing and such
flagmen or gates are not so positioned, unless
there are the warning devices required under
Section 6-7-101, above
9.

All of the crossings affected by the above ordinance

cr«. crossings of a right-of-way which plaintiff acquired from the
Liriharr Canyon and Camp Floyd Railroad in approximately 1881.
Tr.e railroad tracks have existed continually on this right-of-way
since 1663, and the existence of the line of track pre-dates
r.tst c: the city street? which now cross it within the boundary
of

the City of West Jordan
10.

The copulation of the City of West Jordan and its

surrounding communities has increased substantially in recent
years, and the volume of authomobile and other highway traffic
upon the streets which cross the railroad right-of-way within
the City of West Jordan has also increased.
11.

Railroad traffic on the tracks which traverse West

Jordan has not increased in recent years.
12.

Neither the Utah State Department of Transportation

nor the Utah State Public Service Commission has authorized the
placement of flagmen, lights or any of the other protections
referred to in the ordinance at any of the crossings which are
subject to the ordinance since it was enacted
13.

Plaintiff's right-of-way through the City of West

Jordan contains a single track which branches at approximately
-000 West as shown below.

Public roads cross the tracks at

17 locations with sucn protective cevices as indicated
below

Mile

Crossing

Post

Number

Address

Description

BINGHAM BRANCH
1.28

254-871K

1300 West 7960 South

RxB-AW

1.81

254-870D

1700 West 8100 South

CFLS-B (Redwood Road)

2.34

254-869J

2200 West 8250 South
(8180 South)

RxB-AW

2.88

254-868C

2700 West 8400 South

RxB-AW

3.60

254-865G

3385 West 8600 South

RxB-AW

3 95

254-863T

3500 West 8650 South

RxB

4.50

255-377G

4000 West 8980 South

RxB-AW (Old Binghar. Highway)

4.77

254-965L

4200 West 9000 South

RxB-AW (Old Binghar Highway)

5.69

254-968G

4800 West 9400 South

RxB-AW (Old Binghar Highway)

6.30

255-373E

5200 West 9550 South

RxB-AW (Old Binghar Highway)

(Dirt Crossing)

GARFIELD BRANCH
4.80

254-9667

4.95

254-967A

4190 West 8970 South
West Leg Wye
4300 West 9000 South
East Leg Wye

RxB-AW (Old Binghair. Highway)
RxB-AW (Old Bingham Highway)

6.43

254-963X

4620 West 7800 South

RxB

7.45

254-962R

4700 West 7000 South

RxB

8.48

254-961J

4780 West 6200 South

RxB-AW

(Dirt Crossing)

SPUR TRACK PUBLIC CROSSING
3.59

254-866!; 8600 South 3350 West

3.59

254-864A 8600 South 3400 West RxB
(Plastroics Corp.)
Key
RxB-AW = Reflectorized Crossbuck with Advanced
Warning Sign
CFLS-B = Cantilevered Signal with Flashing Lights
and Bell
RxB

RxB

= Reflectorized Crossbuck
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(Hatfield Copper)

14.

The plaintiff presently runs two trains each way on

the subject tracks on a regular, but not on a tinetable, basis
each Monday through Thursday.

The plaintiff runs one train each

way on a regular, but not on a timetable, basis on Fridays and
Saturdays.

Irregular, and unscheduled trains also use the subject

tracks from time to time.
15.

The plaintiff did not receive actual notice that the

ordinance set forth in paragraph 6 above was under consiceration
and, upon receiving notice of its enactment, the plaintiff immediately requested an opportunitv to discuss this matter with
officials of the City of West Jordan.
16.

A meeting was held on April 6, 1962, between

representatives of the plaintiff and the city attorney and city
manager of the City of West Jordan.

At that meeting, the city

manager stated that the city would not consider repeal nor any
amendment of the ordinance and that the city fully intended to
enforce the ordinance.
17.

In passing and enforcing the ordinance, defendants

are acting under color of state law.
18.

The Court expressly makes no finding regarding

whether the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter

of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by virtue of the fact
that it arises unJcr the Ccnercc Clause, Article I, § 8, of the
Constitution of the United States.
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2.

The Court also has jurisdiction over this matter

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by virtue of the fact that plaintiff
is a corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of
Delaware and having its principal place of business in the State
of Colorado, defendant West Jordan Municipal Corporation is a
municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Utah and having its principal place of business ir, the
State of Utah, defendants Dennis K. Randall, Allan G. Tolman,
Shenri Monson, Chris Buttars, Betty Naylor, and Howard Barben are
citizens of the State of Utah, and the matter in controversy
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sinr of $10,000
3.

Venue is proper in the Central Division of this

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) in that all
defendants reside within this division, the claims herein arise
within this division, and defendant West Jordan Municipal Corporation functions as a municipal corporation within this division.
4.

This is an action for declaratory judgment pursuant

to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and
for injunctive relief.
5.

Sections 10-8-36 and 10-6-83 of the Utah Code

Annotated (Repl. Vol

1973) have been repealed to the extent they

are inconsistent with the Public Utilities Act of 1917

The City

of West Jordan had no power or authority to enact the ordinance
known as Sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102 of the West Jordan Municipal
Code, and for this reason the said ordinance is null and void
ab initio.
6.

The laws of the State of Utah have given the Utah

Department of Transportation the exclusive power and authority to
determine, prescribe, and allocate the costs of protecting railroad grade crossings within the State of Utah.
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The actions of the

Department of Transportation are subject to review by the Utah
Public Service Commission.
7.

The protection of railroad grade crossings in the

State of Utah is a matter of state-wide concern

The legislative

grant of authority to the Public Service Commission and the
Department of Transportation in the State of Utah concerning the
protection of railroad grade crossings is pervasive and has
appropriated the entire field of activity in that regard.

The

ordinance enacted by the defendants, Sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102
of the West Jordan Municipal Code, is therefore preempted by
State law and is void
8

The ordinance aforesaid is also preempted and is

therefore void for the further reason that it is inconsistent
witn the following State laws and regulations of the State of
Utah.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-15, 54-4-15.1, 54-4-15.3 (Supp.

1981), Utah Public Service Commission Regulation A 67-05-61.
9.

The Court expressly makes no finding regarding

whether the ordinance constitutes an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce.
10.

Because Sections 6-7-101 and 6-7-102 of the West

Jordan Municipal Code are void, the plaintiff is entitled to have
the Court issue a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants,
and each of them, their deputies, agents, servants and employees
from enforcing the said ordinance in any respect.
DATED this _2£th

da

>'o f

May

. 1962.

/s/ Bruce S. Jenkins

bkucE ST~JE:JKINS~
United States District Judge

